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Chapter One: Introduction
The Huron Indian Cemetery1 sits on a hill above the confluence of the Missouri and Kansas
Rivers. It is several acres of predominant green, with grass, mature trees, and modest, weathered
grave stones, surrounded by the sterile concrete of a struggling Midwestern city. Desultory
businesses, colorless governmental offices, a casino, and strong evidence of poverty and vandalism
lap at the shores of the small sanctuary. Yet despite the drab and essential joylessness of the
encircling faded modernity, the cemetery holds a surprising sense of peace and even timelessness2.
The serenity may seem incongruous, not only because of the tawdry surroundings, but also because
of the cemetery’s chaotic history as a center of numerous legal and economic conflicts.
Perhaps the quiet dignity of the place may have been the source of the strength that enabled
survival. It may have been a force that emanated outward and simultaneously drew energy and
passion within.
This article will focus on the story of endurance and on the reciprocating feelings inspired
by and invested in this unique burial place. It will deal with the general, perhaps inevitable, tension
1It’s

also known as the Wyandot National Burying Ground. See Suzanne Hogan “The Story
Behind the Historic American Indian Cemetery in Downtown KCK” KCVR 89.3 (Oct. 29,
2014) accessed at http://kcur.org/post/story-behind-historic-american-indian-cemeterydowntown-kck
2

For similar sentiments in another threatened place, see Charles Wilkinson, “The Public Lands and
the National Heritage”. 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 499, 503 – 504 (2008).
“The languid stillness of Kaiparowits turns your mind gently and slowly to
wondering about time, to trying to comprehend the long, deep time all of this took,
from Cretaceous, from back before Cretaceous, and to comprehend, since Lake
Powell and the seventy-story stacks of Navajo Generating Station also now play
part of the vista, how it is that our culture has so much might and how it is that we
choose to exert it so frantically, with so little regard of the time that you can see,
actually, see, from here. Perhaps somehow by taking some moments now, here in
this stark pinon-juniper rockland place, here in this farthest-away place, a person
can nurture some of the fibers of constancy and constraint that our people possess
in addition to the might. The silence is stunning, the solitude deep and textured.”
Id at 503 – 504
1

between the sacred and the profane – the clash between the emotion, solemnity, and repose of a
spiritual site, the transformative calculations of economic and political expediency and the law that
may bridge that gap3.
It’s perhaps useful, or even necessary, to have some working conception of the sacred,
especially if it is to be pitted against – or acknowledged within – the persuasive, dollar-based, costbenefit analysis used by business people, legislators and courts. It is essential to have discourse or
dialogue that advocates directly for the sacred and does not attempt to operate behind an opaque
veil of unexplained and unchallengeable faith or emotion4.
It is also imperative for real discussion that economic realists not cynically or
condescendingly question the relevance of all emotion or belief in intangibles. Thus, each side of
the debate must avoid assertions for the total definitional domination if compromise rather than
capitulation is desired5.

3

MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE. (1957 (Hereinafter, ELIADE))

4

Mircea Eliade wrote:
“Revelation of a sacred space makes it possible to obtain a fixed point and hence to
acquire orientation in the chaos of homogeneity, to “found the world” and to live
in a real sense. The profane experience, on the contrary, maintains the homogeneity
and hence the relativity of space. No true orientation is now possible, for the fixed
point no longer enjoys a unique ontological status; it appears and disappears in
accordance with the needs of the day.”

ELIADE, supra note 2, at 23
5

See JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS. (1980) 108 – 109; see also Lawrence
Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law. 83 Yale
L.J. 1315 (1974) (Hereafter, TRIBE).
“At a minimum, we must begin to extricate our nature-regarding impulses from the
conceptually oppressive sphere of human want satisfaction, by encouraging the
elaboration of perceived obligations to plant and animal life and to objects of beauty
in terms that do not falsify such perceptions from the very beginning by insistent
"reference to human interests.”
Id, at 1341
2

One way to begin a discourse on the sacred is to acknowledge the absolute unfathomability
of infinity, eternity, being and nothingness6. Science cannot explain nor can, in all honesty, our
minds even comprehend space without end, the essence of timelessness or creation emergent out
of a void. We can profess an understanding of the abstract concepts but attempts at explanation
chase a horizon line that always retreats beyond our grasp7. Thus we are doomed to live on an
island of tentative reality rather than one of absolute, discernible truth; although we may
successfully attempt to ignore the infinite night that surrounds, it is still, always, there. It would
seem that even the most fervent of realists, or brilliant of physicists or dedicated deniers of God
most contemplate the darkness beyond the light8. There are, as they say, no atheists in the foxholes.
Anglo-Americans and their European predecessors have tended to go aggressively about
the business of living. They brought with them a focus on property, efficiency, and profit that was
to explode beyond community and custom and was to become a central personal and societal

6

TRIBE, supra note 4 at 1346

Id

“The vision of process I have sought to sketch transcends the intermediate stances
of consciousness achieved at discrete points along the spiral's path. Its insistence
on the continuing reformulation and evolution of the principles distilled from it at
each stage provides a way of not only bridging the gap between successive stages
but also energizing the journey through a commitment to overcome the inevitable
inadequacies at each stage. Thus consciousness remains in a double stance: While
vigorously living out the values provided by the present stage, we remain aware of
the fact that these values themselves pass through evolutionary stages whose
unfolding we participate in and sanctify.”

7

See gen., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. (1956), “Nothingness haunts Being”
at 49.

8

See Kenneth Minoque, “The Guru” in RICHARD DE MILLE (ed.), THE DON JUAN PAPERS. (1990),
188
“We live in the island of the tonal and we could not live without it. Nevertheless, it
limits us; and we may break out of these limits if we can come to apprehend the
nagual…by which our world is surrounded and out of which it has been created.”

Id.
3

quest9. This obsession led to a commodification of land and resources, a reduction of natural worth
to monetary pricing and a flattening of quality into quantity and linear measurements 10. In short,
exponential economic growth became the secular of religion of the new nation11. Formal religion
was conscripted into an authorization for the subjugation of the natural; the sacred was confined
behind the walls of the churches, and within the prayers for eternal salvation after death.12
Eventually the Constitution would enshrine this secular religion, though the Declaration of
Independence would link it to God’s will. The Constitution itself would forbid the government’s
establishment of religion, and the interference with its free exercise, and it would enable
individualism and the free market by forbidding the retroactive impairment of contract, and the
taking of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation.13

9

See VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES. 16 – 18 (1995) (Hereinafter, VINE DELORIA).

10

See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1332; See also Douglas Linder, “A New Direction For Preservation
Law: Creating an Environment worth Experiencing” 20 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49, 70-72 (1989).
11

WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY. 184 – 185 (1977).

12

See Lynn White, Jr., “THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF OUR ECOLOGICAL CRISIS”. 155 SCIENCE
1203, 1205 – 1206 (1967).
“We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest
whim. The newly elected Governor of California, like myself a churchman but less
troubled than I, spoke for the Christian tradition when he said (as is alleged), "when
you've seen one redwood tree, you've seen them all." To a Christian a tree can be
no more than a physical fact. The whole concept of the sacred grove is alien to
Christianity and to the ethos of the West. For nearly 2 millennia Christian
missionaries have been chopping down sacred groves, which are idolatrous because
they assume spirit in nature.”

Id, 1206.
13

See John Ragsdale, “To Return from Where We Started: A Revisioning of Property, Land Use,
Economy and Regulation in America”. 45 Urban Lawyer 631, 650 – 659 (2013). See U.S. Const.
amends IV and Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1.
4

American Indians have generally been more expansive, if not purely pantheistic, in their
view of sacredness and obligation14. Most groups believed in the reciprocal relations of everything
in existence, and the imperative human obligation of maintaining balance15. It is true that tribes
could exhibit hostility with one another, have disagreements and divisions within, and could
mismanage the environment16. They still, however, exhibited an overriding community, within
the group and with the earth17. There was an embracing sense of permanence and balance, in
contrast to an ongoing, exponential linear increase18. The primal, intense relations with the land,

14

See PEGGY BECK, ANNA LEE WALTERS, NIA FRANCISCO, THE SACRED: WAYS OF
KNOWLEDGE SOURCES OF LIFE. 3 – 32 (1977) (Hereinafter, THE SACRED).
15

Id, at 102.

16

See SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND HISTORY. 27 (1999).

17

JOHN COLLIER, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS. 7 – 16 (1947)
“They had what the world has lost. They have it now. What the world has lost, the
world must have again, lest it die. Not many years are left to have or have not, to
recapture the lost ingredient.
This is not merely a passing reference to World War III or the atom bomb—
although the reference includes these ways of death, too. These deaths will mean
the end if they come—racial death, self-inflicted because we have lost the way, and
the power to live is dead.
What, in our human world, is this power to live? It is the ancient, lost reverence and
passion for human personality, joined with the ancient, lost reverence and passion
for the earth and its web of life.
This invisible reverence and passion is what the American Indians almost
universally had; and representative groups of them have it still.
They had and have this power for living, which our modern world has lost – as
world-view and self-view, as tradition and institution, as practical philosophy
dominating their societies and as an art supreme among all the arts.”

Id, at 7.
18

David H. Getches, “A Philosophy of Permanence: The Indian Legacy for the West”, 29 JOURNAL
OF THE WEST, 54 – 68 (July 1990).
“Indians survived on the American continents for thousands of years based on a
pervasive set of cultural values integrating human life with other forms of life.
5

traced through the tribal histories, legends and culture, can stretch these sacred concerns across
extensive sweeps of time and space – far beyond an immediate presence or physical control19.
Within this revered fabric were and are special places of even more intense emotional sanctity,
commemoration or revelation. These sites are the sacred polestars of the tribal communities – the
hubs around which all life, ceremony and world view revolve. Even in times of physical dislocation
and stress, these center places could maintain or reunite the tribal community.
“The vast majority of Indian tribal religions, therefore, have a sacred center at a
particular place, be it a river, a mountain, a plateau, valley, or other natural feature.
This center enables the people to look out along the four dimensions and locate
their lands, to relate all historical events within the confines of this particular land,
and to accept responsibility for it. Regardless of what subsequently happens to the
people, the sacred lands remain as permanent fixtures in their cultural or religious
understanding. Thus, many tribes now living in Oklahoma, but formerly from the
eastern United States, still hold in their hearts the sacred locations of their history,
and small groups travel to obscure locations in secret to continue tribal ceremonial
life20.

Today these same values guide tribes in the United States as they move into an era
of unprecedented sophistication in managing reservation environments. Most
important for the non-Indian West, Indian values arc crucial for the future of a
region where resource issues are intertwined with economic and social survival.”
Id, 54.
19

JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS. 17 – 39 (1959)
“Then I was standing on the highest mountain of them all, and round about beneath
me was the whole hoop of the world. And while I stood there I saw more than I can
tell and I understood more than I saw; for I was seeing in a sacred manner the shapes
of all things in the spirit, and the shape of all shapes as they must live together like
one being. And I saw the sacred hoop of my people was one of the many hoops that
made one circle, wide as daylight and as starlight, and in the center grew one mighty
flowering tree to shelter all the children of one mother and one father. And I saw
that it was holy.”

Id, at 36.
20

VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION. 66 (2003) (Hereinafter, GOD
IS RED).
6

Over the course of the four centuries since the European incursion, the Indians sacred world
was physically shattered; many of the most revered sites were on lands lost, along the various
Trails of Tears, or on lands threatened by the non-Indians’ relentless, uncaring economy, law and
politics21.
The laws and the courts of the conqueror22 have, in the latter part of the twentieth century
provided significant protection for non-possessory sacred sites, but the reach of the laws has still
been limited by the lateness of their arrival, by legislative and judicial compromise, and by the
protection of private property through the takings clause. Much of the sacred has slipped through
the gaps and been lost forever. Much that remains is still threatened23. In a few cases, the dedication
and extraordinary efforts of the individuals may transcend the available law and pave a way to
future reconsiderations.
This article chronicles the odyssey of the Wyandot people and a place of burial along their
journey way. It deals with the fierce dedication of some singular individuals to this sacred
cemetery, that saved it when the law faltered. It concludes that the preservation of this sacred
cemetery not only sustained the local community but reunited the tribe, after secular forces had
forced a schism. It also suggests that both the place and the people that have uncompromisingly
loved it provide a source of inspiration and aspiration for non-Indian people.

21

VINE DELORIA, JR., SPIRIT AND REASON. 323 – 328 (1999) (Hereinafter, SPIRIT AND REASON).

22

See WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR. (2010) (Hereinafter,
CONQUEROR).
23

Id, at 325 – 356: See also Kristen A. Carpenter, “Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices
in American Indian Religious Freedoms”. 45 Conn. L. Rev. 387, 447-460 (2012; Kelly D. Lynn,
“Seeking Environmental Justice for Cultural Minorities: The South Lawerence Trafficway of
Lawrence, Kansas”. 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 221, 241-243 (2003); Ted Griswold, Jonathan P.
Scoll, “Gregory Mountain: A Sacred Site Protection Failure”. 26 WTR Natural Resources &
Environmental 56 (2012); William Perry Pendley, “The Establishment Clause and the Closure of
“Sacred” Public and Private Lands”. 83 Denv. U.L. Rev. 1023, 1032-1033 (2006).
7

Chapter 2: The Removal of the Wyandots – 1842
The Wyandot Indians, descended in part from the once powerful Hurons24 were less
orientated toward war than their militant ancestors, in part because they were relatively small in
number. They, instead, were oriented toward a stable-state, subsistence life-style featuring
agriculture, hunting, fishing and fur-trapping, especially after the arrival of the French traders25.
By the beginning of the eighteenth Century, when the white incursion into the trans-Appalachian
area was gathering force, the Wyandots had come to occupy a somewhat uneasy balance point
south of Lake Erie, with the Iroquois to the East, and The Sioux to the West26. The Wyandots
began their interactions in a friendly fashion, dealing first with the French fur traders, then allying
with them when subsequent tensions emerged between the French and their English competitors27.
By 1754, full scale war had broken out. Although the French and their Indian allies were
successful at the outset, the English numbers and firepower eventually prevailed, and the French
withdrew from the Ohio Valley28.
The still-resistant Wyandots, along with their long-time allies, the Ottawa, participated in
the Pontiac Rebellion, which followed the conclusion of the French and Indian War. The effort,
though unsuccessful in daunting the British29, still influenced the Crown to continue the Indian

24

FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE. 101 – 102, 352 – 353 (1984)
(Hereinafter, JENNINGS).
25

Elisabeth Tooker, “Wyandot” in WILLIAM C. STURTEVANT ED, “15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS – NORTHEAST, 398 – 399 (1978) (Hereinafter, TOOKER).
26

JENNINGS, supra note 24, at 352 – 353.

27

TOOKER, supra note 25, at 399.

28

Douglas Edward Leach, “Colonial Indian Wars”. In WILLIAM C. STURTEVANT ED., 4
HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS – HISTORY OF INDIAN – WHITE RELATIONS, 137 –
139 (1988).
29

Id, at 141 – 142.
8

pacification efforts manifested in the Proclamation of 176330. The Proclamation forbade the
settlement of English colonists in the Ohio Valley, and precluded their acquisition of Indian land.
In a sense the proclamation was the first reservation of land as sovereign Indian country in the
Americas31.
“In short, the Proclamation of 1763 sought to resolve the three most important
struggles that plagued the management of colonial Indian affairs and which,
ironically, epitomized the focus the Euro-American/Indian conflict over the next
225 years. These three struggles involved: (1) the contest between centralized and
colonial – now state – management of relations with Indian tribes; (2) conflicts
between honoring legal and treaty guarantees of Indian land rights and autonomy
and the Euro-American settlers’ economic need for land and resources; and (3)
difficulties involved in reconciling Indian political sovereignty with the authority
of surrounding governments, particularly colonial – now state – authority. The
Proclamation was designed to resolve these issues in favor of centralized control,
through agents responsible to London, through protecting Indian treaty guarantees,
land rights, and access to hunting and fishing resources necessary to their survival
and through recognizing and respecting tribal sovereignty and autonomy32.”
The Proclamation also proved to be a legal lynch-pin for the Supreme Court’s’ later
incorporation of the international doctrine of discovery into the center of future land titles
emanating from the United States. Johnson v. McIntosh33 affirmed that the discoverer of the new
lands in the Americans, and the successor, acquired not only priority with respect to other
contending Christian explorers34, but also a legal fee title that would become a transferable fee

30

Wilbur R. Jacobs, “British Indians Policies to 1783”. In WILLIAM C. STURTEVANT ED. 4
HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS – HISTORY OF INDIAN – WHITE RELATIONS”, 10 –
12 (1988).
31

Robert N. Clinton, “THE PROCLAMATION OF 1763: COLONIAL PRELUDE TO TWO CENTURIES OF
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS”, 69 BOSTON UNIV L.
REV. 329, 369 – 380 (1989)
32

Id, at 370.

33

21 US. 543, (1823).

34

21 US. at 573.
9

simple absolute after the extinguishment of Indian possessory title. The discoverer or successor
had the exclusive power to extinguish, either through purchase or conquest35. Thus unauthorized
attempts to acquire possession, after the Proclamation of 1763, after the transfer of English
sovereignty to the states, or after the passage of ultimate sovereignty to the United States are void 36.
The Proclamation of 1763 was also a substantial factor in colonial irritation with Great
Britain’s economic domination and in the ensuing revolution37. Indeed, the freedom sought by the
colonists, and lauded in The Declaration of Independence, was, in significant part, the freedom to
appropriate the land and resources of the Indians west of the Appalachians38.
The Articles of Confederation adopted by the revolutionary states in 1777, did not unify
Indian affairs in the new Continental Congress, but reserved power to deal with Indian lands in the
individual states39. By 1787, the uncertainty over the dispersed land power and the direct actions
of frontier whites, who were pouring into the Ohio Valley, had created general chaos and threats
of Indian wars40.
The Constitution of the United States, drafted in 1787, and ratified in 1788, consolidated
the power over Indian lands in Congress41. It responded with the Trade and Intercourse Act of

35

21 US. at 587

36

21 US. at 604 - 605

37

DAVID GETCHES, CHARLES WILKINSON, ROBERT WILLIAMS, MATHEW FLETCHER, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, 6th Ed. 60 – 61 (2011) (Hereinafter, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW).

38

Id, at 62.

39

Id, at 62 – 63; See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1154 (2nd Cir. 1988); See
U.S. Articles of Confederation, Art. IX (4) (1777).
40

BILL GILBERT, GOD GAVE US THIS COUNRTY, 114 – 117 (1989); STUART BANNER, HOW THE
INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND. 124 – 159 (2005).
41

COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 2012 Ed., 22 (Hereinafter, COHEN’S); See U.S.
Const. Art. 1, 58.
10

179042, which prohibited the sale of Indian lands to states or private persons except under the
authority of the United States. Despite the unifying of treaty and land acquisition power in the
federal government, conflict with the tribes escalated.
Responding to the threats of rising violence and possible united Indian action, George
Washington sent military expeditions into the Ohio Valley. After initial defeats were suffered by
Generals Harmar and St. Clair, Washington dispatched General Anthony Wayne who defeated the
Indians decisively at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 179443. The Treaty of Greenville was signed
in 179544 by the surviving Indian leaders including Tarhe, the chief of the Wyandots45.
The Greenville Treaty line, drawn through Ohio, ceded Indian territory, south and east of
the line, and confined the Wyandots, and other tribes to the Great Lakes area. It was not the last of
the cessions. By 1817 the Wyandots, withered by war and disease to less than one tenth of their
pre-incursion number, had ceded all their Ohio Valley land with the exception of the Grand
Reserve at Upper Sandusky, approximately 110,000 acres, and a small reserve of 5,000 acres on
the Huron River, near Detroit46.
The compression of their sovereign land holdings forced the Wyandot to modify their
economy, and turn from hunting and trapping to a concentration on agriculture. The resiliant
Wyandots, from the time of Tarhe and the signing of the Greenville Treaty, acknowledged the
inevitability of the white western advancement, and the necessity of fundamental adjustment 47.

42

COHEN’S, supra note 41, at 35; See Act of July 22, 1790, 4, 1 Stat. 137; 25 U.S.C § 177.
ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES. 90 – 93 (1970) (Hereinafter,
DEBO).
43

44

Treaty with the Wyandot, etc. 7 Stat 49 (1795).

45

See Jan English, The Wyandot Nation of Kansas. In THE CONSOLIDATED ETHNIC HISTORY OF
WYANDOTTE COUNTY. 517, 526 (2000) (Hereinafter, JAN ENGLISH).
46

Id, at 528; See also TOOKER, supra note 25, at 402.

47

JAN ENGLISH, supra note 45, at 526 – 527.
11

Thus, they turned to white methodology – fencing, plowing, and animal husbandry. They lived in
log houses, wore white clothing and substantially embraced the Methodist church 48. Indeed, the
Wyandots, through adoption and marriage had become racially mixed with few, if any, remaining
full bloods49. Despite the substantial racial, material and economic blending, however, the tribe
firmly maintained its cultural, political and linguistic integrity50.
The experience of the Cherokee had recently demonstrated that tribal advancements in
white economy and material society were no assurance that the white wave could be stemmed. A
mere defusing of the pretextual claim that tribalism and savagery were incompatible with
ascendant white society could not defeat the rapacious land hunger that grew increasingly
frustrated with Indian assertions of political sovereignty and territorial control51.
The national response, in 1830, was the Indian Removal Act52. The legislation was born
from an odd combination of motivations including the desire for free land, a concern for the
internal protection of states’ rights, and a general humanitarian feeling that Indian societies would
be eroded or destroyed by corrosive contract with whites53. The possibility of removal, as a unified,
out-of-sight and mind solution, was made theoretically possible by the vast Louisiana Purchase of
trans-Mississippi lands. Thomas Jefferson, in fact, was among the architects of Indian removal,
several decades before. He overcame his constitutional equivocations about executive power and

48

TOOKER, supra note 25, at 402.

49

Kimberly Dayton, “Trespassers Beware: Lyda Burton Conley and the Battle for the Huron Place
Cemetery”. 8 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND FEMINISM 1, 5 (1996) (Hereinafter, DAYTON).
50

Id, at 5.

51

See Duane King, “Introduction” in CHEROKEE INDIAN NATION, DUANE KING ED., XV-XVI
(1979).
52

Act of May 28, 1830. 4 Stat 411.

53

FRANCIS PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, 195-199 (1984) (Hereinafter, PRUCHA).
12

national land holding to buy the land that could make this happen54. The act, despite its draconian
– sounding title, professed to call for voluntary and negotiated departure, rather than extermination,
and thus called for treaties of cession with willing tribes55.
The Wyandots, however, were not eager to sell, although they did go west to the frontier
to inspect some of the proffered land. William Walker Jr., a mixed race Wyandot leader, a
formidable intellectual, and later to be the first provisional governor of the Nebraska Territory, led
an exploratory expedition, the first of several, and in general found the lands – and the rough
frontier whites nearby –unsuitable56. In 1839, however, the Wyandots concluded that Shawnee
lands, west of the Missouri line near Westport, were satisfactory and a draft treaty to purchase
58,000 acres was composed – but was never ratified by the Senate57.
The inertia and indecision of the Wyandots was broken, however, in November of 1940
when the Wyandot Principal Chief, Summudowat, and his family were robbed and murdered by
whites in the Henry County, Ohio. The dismissal of indictments convinced the Wyandots that
white law would not protect them, and that it was time to leave58. They were the last of the
Northeastern tribes to agree to remove59.

54

Id, at 183 – 184; See also JON MEACHAM, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE ART OF POWER, 389-392
(2012).
55

COHEN’S supra note 41, at 44.

56

GRANT FOREMAN, THE LAST TREK OF THE INDIANS, 92-93 (1946) (Hereinafter, FOREMAN).

57

VINE DELORIA JR. and RAYMOND DEMAILLE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN
DIPLOMACY, citing “Treaty With The Shawnee, December 18, 1839” at 781.
58

LARRY HANCKS, THE EMIGRANT TRIBES: WYANDOT, DELAWARE AND SHAWNEE. 146 (1998)
(Hereinafter, THE EMIGRANT TRIBES).
59

DAYTON, supra note 49, at 5.
13

Under the terms of the treaty60, the tribe ceded the Grand Reserve of Ohio, 109,144 acres,
and the Wyandot Reserve of Michigan, 4,996 acres61. The United States granted an indeterminate
tract of 148,000 acres to be located west of the Mississippi “on any lands owned by the United
States…not already assigned to any other tribe or nation62.” The Wyandot still hoped to buy land
from the Shawnee, but they left Ohio without an agreement, and with no other definite, settled
destination63.

Chapter Three: A New Beginning Around the Cemetery
on the Hill—and Another Removal.
Indian removal was a low point of Federal policy, and despite the veil of negotiation, was
designed to be destructive in both a cultural and perhaps physical sense64. It is appropriate to view
this as genocidal65. The Wyandots, despite their advancement in, or adaptations to, white society
and economy, received no respite. The end of their trek from Ohio to Kansas ended in driving rain
and uncertainty. Because the land promised was neither provided nor obtainable, they were forced
to camp in the swampy bottoms of the Missouri River66. Almost a tenth of the tribal population,

60

Treaty with the Wyandot 11 Stat., 581 (March 17, 1842).

61

Id, Article 1.

62

Id, Article 2.

63

WILLIAM ELSEY CONNELLEY, A STANDARD HISTORY OF KANSAS AND KANSANS. 257 (1918)
(Hereinafter, CONNELLEY).
64

PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST. 194 (1987).

65

Lindsay Glauner, “The Need for Accountability and Reparations: 1830-1976 the United States
Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide
against Native Americans”. 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 912 – 913, 931 - 934 (2002).
66

See FOREMAN, supra note 56 at 97 – 98; JAN ENGLISH, supra note 45, at 530 – 531.
14

many of them children, died within the first few months67. Thus, before the Wyandot had even
procured land to live on, they had to find places for the dead68.
The Wyandots believed that ultimately they could buy land from the Delaware, who held
a reserve stretching west, across the Missouri and north of its junction with the Kansas River. The
Delaware, who had been allies with the Wyandots in Ohio gave their permission, pending the
negotiations, and the Wyandot crossed the river with their dead69. They buried them on high point
of land above the confluence of the two rivers, and this spot was to become known as the Huron
Indian Cemetery70. By the end of 1843 the Wyandot and the Delaware had forged a treaty, without
any United States involvement, and agreed to a Wyandot purchase of 36 sections. The Delaware,
remembering past Wyandot favors, added 3 more sections as a gift71. Though the treaty was ratified
by the United States in 1848, the 148,000 acres promised by the United States in 1842 remained
unforthcoming, and the Wyandots were forced to buy their new reserve with their own money and
credit72.
The Wyandots built their new settlement surrounding the cemetery which, due to its
location between the rivers, had both strategic commercial potential – as well as vulnerability to

67
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the seamier sides of frontier life such as thieves and whiskey peddlers73. However, the building of
homes, the establishment of church and schools and the rich agriculture lands had a stabilizing
influence on the new community74. Led by the educated Wyandot intelligentsia – the Walkers,
Zanes, Tauromees, Northrups, Hicks and Armstrongs, the new town of Wyandot City became a
vibrant jumping-off place for the cresting wave of western expansion75.
The Wyandots, far from eschewing white contact and seeking isolation, embraced the
white society and sought to emulate it and profit from it. The tribe formed a new, progressive
constitutional government, complete with a balanced division of power, strong property laws,
economic ambitions and Christian temperance; and they blended it with their traditional culture76.
In a sense, they retrofitted their historic society both for interaction with the surrounding,
inescapable white society and for the simultaneous maintenance of their internal sovereignty and
traditions. This is much the same as would be attempted under John Collier and Felix Cohens’
Indian Reorganization Act almost a century later77.
The question was, in 1850, would the non-Indian society regard the Wyandots as deserving
of acceptance and equal protection, or would they, because of unabated racial and cultural
prejudices, regard them as expendable? Once again, as in Ohio, the Wyandot may have mistaken
the effect that their sophisticated formal structure and civilized veneer would have on the white
society. The forces of western advance sought cheap land and right-of-way to the Pacific, and if
the Indians could be induced to move, regardless of their priority or their institutions, that would
be preferable. Though the removal treaties of the 1830’s and 1840’s had promised a permanent
73
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repose in the lands west of Missouri and Iowa78, honor and theory was no match for economic
realities and the apologies of superior culture and race79.
In March of 1853, a rider to an Indian appropriation bill authorized the President to
negotiate removal with the tribes west of the Missouri and Iowa lines80 and the following year, the
Kansas – Nebraska Act created official territories and opened the area to settlement81. Paul Gates
later stated “There was not an acre of land that was available for sale,” instead there was “a
formidable array of Indian reservations… to which they owners clung tenaciously82…” In the
winter of 1853-1854, George Manypenny, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, arrived on the
Indian Frontier with the objective of negotiating a new round of treaties with the barely settled
emigrant tribes83. Manypenny was sensitive to the fact that the Indians had received the most
solemn and absolute promises of permanence only a few decades before84. Likewise, he did not
adhere to the expedient, self-serving view that Indians were racial and cultural inferiors that would
hold land perpetually in a state of nature, and deny the dominant cultures right of subjugation85.
Realistically, however, Manypenny and many of the educated tribal leaders recognized the flood-
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like, dispassionate economic forces that had been unleashed by the discovery of western gold, and
the annexation of Texas and the Mexican Cession86.
Manypenny’s resolution was a series of treaties in 1854 and 1855 with the emigrant eastern
tribes along the permanent Indian frontier. In general the treaties featured large cessions of land
that opened the way to travel and settlement, and some reduced reservations and individual
allotments for the tribes87. The device of allotment would convert collectively-held tribal land into
individualized tracts, paralleling in size those available under the federal land disposition
scheme88. Federal officials believed that allotments would free up land for whites, teach Indian the
value of farming and private property, and depower the tribes89. The experiments in Kansas paved
the way for general utilization of allotments as the primary tool of assimilation90.
It was also felt by Manypenny and others that individualized property and smaller reserves
would be more easily protected. It was to his chagrin that his inclusionary experiment came largely
to naught; by the mid 1870’s most of the allotments had been lost through duress, fraud and the
pressures of poverty, and only small reservations, and a few allotments still remained in central
Kansas91.
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The Wyandot Treaty of 185592, was not an immediate outgrowth of Manypenny’s
involvement, but was instead the culmination of five years of negotiations conducted by the
Wyandot intelligentsia as a facet of the tribes continuing claim for the 148,000 acres promised but
unfulfilled by the Treaty of 184293. These discussions broached but did not resolve the additional
issues of citizenship and land in severalty. They did, however, make a formalistic attempt to rectify
the failures of 1842. The Treaty with the Wyandot of 185094 promised the Wyandots $185,000, in
return for their release of claims to the promised, but un-received, 148,000 acres95. The United
States again failed to fulfill their promise, and the Wyandot leaders redoubled their efforts to parlay
their small but strategic thirty-nine section reserve into economic and political advantage96.
In 1855, a small faction of progressives, in clear violation of the Wyandot Constitution97,
signed a document that agreed to dissolve the tribe, apportion the land in individualized severalty
to all the members, and make United States citizenship available to those competents who chose
it98.
More specifically, the tribe agreed, in Article One, to dissolve its organization and
terminate its relations with the United States, except as necessary to carry out the stipulations
92
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therein99. In this regard, there were several dangling and continuing obligations. In one sense, the
land held as tribal property would, under the treaty, be ceded to the United States for survey100 and
redistribution to “all the individuals and members of the Wyandot Tribe101. Each tribal member,
then, either as an individual or part of a family, could share equally in the former tribal lands. In
addition, the United States agreed to pay $380,000, plus accrued annuities and unpaid investments
from the Treaty of 1850, in return for the general relinquishment of all tribal claims, including
former treaties102.
The strings that remained were several. A list of Wyandots deemed incompetent by reason
of age, mental capacity or orphan status was to be prepared, guardians were to be appointed and
review was to be made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In addition, though citizenship was
available to competent Wyandots who wanted it, those who didn’t wish it could apply for
temporary exemptions and continued protection and assistance from the United States103.
Finally, the treaty specified that two acres “now enclosed and used as a public burying
ground be permanently reserved and appropriated for that purpose104.” The treaty doesn’t say who,
exactly, was the beneficiary of this trust, but it does seem to assume the United States as the trusteeobligor, and as the stakeholder for much of the ensuing conflict.
The treaty purported to dissolve the tribe105, but it contained a provision allowing
competent class Wyandots to defer citizenship. At least 60 Wyandots, more concerned with
99
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maintenance of the traditional community than with individual financial and political prospects,
formed an Indian party under the leadership of Tauromee, a former principal chief106. These
traditionalists continued to observe the past customs, practices and ceremonies. Among these
tribalists was Hannah Zane, grandmother of the Conley girls whose life mission would be the
preservation of the sanctity of Huron Indian Cemetery107.
In 1857 a group of the traditionalists and incompetent non-citizens emigrated to the Seneca
Reserve in northern Oklahoma, but many returned to Kansas after the Confederate invasion of the
Reserve in 1862108. Relations between the returning emigrants and the citizen-class Wyandots
remained strained109 and in 1867, after negotiations in Washington by Tauromee, the United States
signed an omnibus treaty which, in part, allowed the Indian party Wyandots to purchase land from
the Seneca in Northern Oklahoma and resume tribal status110.
Thus, the Wyandots who emigrated to Oklahoma, either because they refused citizenship
and chose tribalism, or because they were labeled incompetent to choose, established the new

“The driving force behind the treaty was a group of men who believed both that
they could better secure their property with the protection offered by citizenship
and that they had a real stake in the future of Kansas Territory. For those Wyandots
who opposed the treaty, eastern Kansas no longer provided safe home and
relocation appeared to be the best option. Although Kansas and Indian Territory
served as the stage, the federal government’s lists served as the media through
which these opposing parties acted out their respective visions of the Wyandots’
future.”
Id, at 210.
106

THE EMIGRANT TRIBES, supra note 58, at 230; See also BOWES supra note 67, at 217.

107

DAYTON supra notes 49, at 10; see infra Chapter Four.

108

See United Government of Wyandotte County (Larry Hancks), “Huron Indian Cemetery”.
www.wycokck.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id,at 5 (Herein after, HANCKS).

109

Id

110

Id; See Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca, and Shawnee, Qupaw, etc. 1867, 15 Stat 513
(Proclaimed Oct 14, 1868), Article 13; See BOWES, supra note 67, at 217.
21

Wyandot tribe in Oklahoma, and were legally both wards of the United States, and entitled to the
benefits and prerogatives of recognized tribal Indians111. The tribe refused to grant membership to
citizen-Wyandots who remained in Kansas112. But some of the Kansas Wyandots had never sought
111

See COHEN’S, supra note 42, at 152.

112

DAYTON, supra note 49, at 12. The fact that non –citizen Wyandots from Kansas were part of
the tribalists argueably recognized by the Treaty of 1862 (see infra footnote 315), has induced
some to assert that the present day Wyandot Nation of Kansas, need not continue its petition for
recognition before the Bureau of Indian Affairs (See infra notes 340-344) because they are still
recognized and, indeed, have a judicial claim against the United States for mismanagement of trust
assets. See Andrew Westney, “Kansas Tribe Says DOI Mismanaged Trust Lands in KC” Law
360, New York (June 2, 2015).
“The Wyandot Nation of Kansas hit the federal government with a complaint
Monday in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, alleging the U.S. Department of the
Interior failed to require Kansas City, Kansas, to pay for easements on tribal trust
land in a cemetery and mismanaged their nation’s trust lands and funds.
The government failed to fulfill its trust duties for the sale of historical tribal trust
lands under an 1867 treaty and failed to charge the city of Kansas City for its use
of two streets that run through the edges of the nation’s trust land in the Huron
Indian Cemetery.
The breach of trust claims include the government’s “failure to collect, deposit,
account for and invest plaintiff’s trust funds derived from its treaty lands” and its
failure to protect the nation’s ownership interest in the lands and funds, according
to the complaint.
While the nation isn’t included in the BIA’s list of federally recognized tribes, it
claims it is federally recognized under the 1867 treaty, according to the complaint.
The predecessor to the current Wyandot Nation acquired the 2 acres in the cemetery
among other trust lands it received from the Delaware Nation under an 1843 treaty,
according to the complaint.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has had complete control over the cemetery lands
since 1855, including executing a 1918 contract with the city for the care and
preservation of the grounds, according to the complaint.
But the DOI grossly mismanaged the lands, in part by failing to require that Kansas
City obtain and pay for easements, as required by federal law, for portions of
Minnesota Avenue and Seventh Street in the city that pass through corners of the
nation’s cemetery trust land.
The nation asserts four claims for relief, including for funds owed to the nation by
the government for the cemetery lands and funds owed for the sale of trust lands
under the 1867 treaty and the 1994 American Indian Trust Fund Management
22

citizenship and wished to be listed on the Indian role, and thus eligible for tribal membership.
Among them was Eliza Burton Zane Conley , daughter of Hannah Zane who requested that she
and her family be placed on the official Indian list – a request that failed. Conley and her children
were mistakenly placed on the citizen-Wyandot list, a mistake that would play a significant role in
Lyda Conley’s subsequent suit to protect the cemetery113.

Chapter Four: Sanctity and Assault
A. The Sanctity of Burials
Most societies, present and past, have protected their burial grounds and remains against
disturbance114. James Frazier concluded “the place where the dead are deposited all civilized

Reform Act, as well as mismanagement by the government of both those categories
of funds.
The nation alleges the government breached its constitutional, treaty, statutory and
fiduciary duties. The amount of monetary damages the nation is owed is uncertain
because of the government’s failure to account for the nation’s trust funds,
according to the complaint.”
Accessed at http://www.law360.com/articles/662714/print?section=government contracts.
See also Wyandot Nation of Kansas v. United States, 115 Fed.Ct 595 (2014)(Tribe’s claims
barred under statutes precluding courts jurisdiction because plaintiff had suit with respect
to same claim pending in Federal District Court).
The Tribe may prove to have a further problem with their claim for damages to the property
of a recognized fiduciary, caused by mismanagement, because of a recent holding that
federal recognition can be lost by abandonment or gaps in the pattern of services or
identifications over a period of time. See Mowekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d
209 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “A once-recognized tribe can fade away”, 708 F.3d at 219, and the
entity, in order to regain recognized status, must procede, not through the courts, but
through the administrative petition process in 25 CFR Section 83.8. See 708 F.3d at 218220.
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nations and many barbarous ones regard… as consecrated ground”115 American common law
would support this in theory, and disturbing burials is generally permitted only under careful
supervision or compelling circumstances116. Disturbance does occur, however, and not
infrequently, even in the case of Anglo-American remains, when development requires it, or when
family or cultural linkages grow dim.117
The common law and statutory law of the United States has, in general, shown far less
protection and respect for the graves and remains of traditional Indians. The law has allowed Indian
remains, found on land not owned by descendents or culturally affiliated tribes, to be excavated,
removed, possessed and displayed by landowners, scientists, museums, hobbyists, and macabre
profit-seekers.118 Not until 1990 did Congress enact a real semblance of protection and property
rights with the passage of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA).119 Under NAGPRA, rights of possession are declared in lineal descendants and
culturally affiliated tribes for remains found on federal or tribal lands after 1990.120 Rights of
repatriation for remains held in federally-funded museums both in 1990 and thereafter are likewise
vested in lineal descendants and culturally affiliated tribes.121 NAGPRA does not apply to remains
found on state or private land unless they are thereafter placed in the legal possession of a federally-
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funded museum or a funded entity such as a school or town that is deemed a museum for NAGPRA
repatriation purposes.122
Before and even after the passage of NAGPRA, the sanctity of an Indian burial site was –
and is – not afforded the right of repose.123 The best that descendants can really achieve is the
property rights of repatriation, and even these rights may be subject to definitional limitation or
problems of proving cultural affiliation.124
The less than complete protection of all burials, under the American common law, which
allows expediency to trump sanctity, and the historically abject insensitivity of the American law
toward tribal cemeteries and burials are compounded in their impact on traditional Indian
communities which tend to uncompromisingly sacralize their burial sites.125 This unqualified
regard stems from several deep sources. In one sense, the graves are part of the land itself, and the
land, for traditional Indian peoples, is itself sanctified.126 It has been said that the Indians’ “belief
122
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in the sacredness of the earth is the basis for their belief in the holiness of particular places.”127
Reverence for the remains of ancestors buried at particular places may itself blend several sources.
It is seldom suggested that the dead themselves are deities,128 but there is strong indication,
especially among Indians of the Great Lakes region, that reverence is based in respect, love and
the desire for spiritual guidance.129 In a related sense, the ancestors may be seen as intermediaries
with higher spiritual beings, or as personal guardians to their descendants.130
In a related manner, the sacred dead, as intermediaries between the gods, the past, the
present and future, demonstrate the fundamental Indian belief in interdependency, and balanced
relationships that is “at the root of native North American sacred tradition.”131 It may also
demonstrate what is found in Indian thought – a non-linear, wholistic, cyclical view of life and
time.132 Thus ancestors, as intermediaries or personal guardians, are seen as present, and not just
remembered.133 Consciousness can be collective among the living members of a tribe or
tied to particular landmarks, and each performance continues a process of endlessly
remembering, renewing, and revising relationships within ecosystems which are
themselves forever reiterating yet changing. The landscape not only contains the
imprints of past lives, but continually moves people to sing new songs. Landscape
is the central integrating principle of culture and artistic expression.”
Id, 129.
127
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community, and can simultaneously embrace the past and future in a timeless whole.134 Jan
English, principal chief of the Kansas Wyandot, remembered the ancestors in conversations at the
Huron Indian Cemetery.
“English sits, remembering sack lunches here with her Aunt Edith, who would tell
stories about the great Wyandot leader Chief Tarhe and her other ancestors. English
is French and English, too but her aunt’s stories made her feel more Wyandot than
anything else. ‘Timeless,’ is the word she uses to describe the feeling.”135
Eliza Burton “Lyda” Conley,136 a Kansas Wyandot Indian, spoke, of the sacred centrality
of Indian burial grounds in general, and Huron Indian Cemetery, in particular, to the Supreme
Court of the United States. More will be discussed about Lyda Conley and the case later,137 but in
the context of the general focus on the sanctity of burials, it is worthwhile to read here her
presentation to the Court. It was the first argument made to the Supreme Court by an Indian
woman,138 and the first time the Court was called on to deal with the topic of sacred Indian
burials.139
Conley said,
“History tells us that a superstitious reverence for and burial of the dead has been
found a distinguishing trait of Indian character—to some extent we believe this to
be true—as graves of the redmen were their only monuments, so traditions were
their only history... Like Jacob of old I too, when I shall be gathered unto my people,
desire that they bury me with my fathers in Huron Cemetery, the most sacred and
hallowed spot on earth to me, and I cannot believe that this is superstitious
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reverence ay more than I can believe that the reverence every true American has
for the grave of Washington as Mount Vernon is a superstitious reverence… The
wisest man the world has ever known admonishes, ‘Remove not the ancient
(landmark), which thy fathers have set..’ and that the hand of the desecrator
‘remove not the old landmark; and enter not unto fields of the fatherless; For their
redeemer is mighty; he shall plead their cause with thee.’ Man goeth to his long
home, and the mourners go about the street; or ever the silver could be loose, or the
golden bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at the fountain; or the well broken
at the cistern. Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall
return unto God who gave it.”140
Stepping outside the positivistic boundaries of the law, for a moment, one can question:
What is owed to the sacred and why? This query needs a framework, as all altruistic, non-gain,
seeking behavior may necessitate borders.141 We can loosely posit the community as the arena,
but this needs some further definition. We can describe the community within which the
accounting to the sacred is examined, as an aggregate of reciprocal, balanced interactions, or as a
collection of common beliefs, attitudes, characteristics or interests.142
Within a community, then, at a minimum, respect and reverence are generally afforded to
final resting places – by the descendants, by the friends, and usually by visitors. Beyond this,
however, burial places may be the recipients of affirmative duty and obligation – acts of
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“These incomparable religious expressions are incomparable educational forces
too; they form the Indian soul and being, perpetually renew it, induct each
generation into the whole of the heritage, sustain the society, discipline as well as
nurture its members, and insure their military efficiency. The tribal will to live is
closely united with these communal religious inpourings and outpourings. But
above all, at this point, the balanced man-sidedness of the Indian group is stressed,
and the crucial function of their cosmically oriented religions in producing the
many-sidedness and holding it in poised union, each part with all the differing parts,
in a community whose shared life is lived with confident power by al its members.”
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maintenance, protection and even worship. Where do these enhanced duties come from? It may,
as mentioned, be positivistic – if not from formal law, from143 the deep-set commands of custom.
The devout may infer a mandate directly from God.144 But, a larger sense, duty may be chosen.
Lawrence Tribe said that the choice to be obligated, to things, ideas, and circumstances beyond
oneself,145 is the highest exercise of freedom. Such choice could, but need not be, the selfconsuming duty of martyrdom or sacrifice. More realistically for most, the guardian of the sacred
may choose a living duty of protection and thereby become part of the coherent, timeless
continuum between the past and the future.146 Indeed, in a life of service to the scared, one may
143
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Rev. 29, 29 – 34 (2000)
As we lose contact with, and respect for life generally, we also lose respect for one
another as humans. In saying this, I am rejecting the argument, which is frequently
heard today, that industrialized societies are morally superior because they place
such a high value on humans, human welfare, and human rights. It may be true that
the most industrialized societies elevate humans over all other forms of life, in
essence they have become human-centered. But this does not mean that
technological societies genuinely respect human life over which they have achieved
such enormous power. It only means that industrialized societies are completely
self-absorbed, and make decisions based chiefly upon the consequences of their
human members (often, the interests of only a very small human elite).
We are not becoming more humane; we are becoming more selfish as individuals
and as nation-states. We are withdrawing, to use Tagore’s analogy, behind the walls
of our artificial cities. Even as technology has made it possible for us to maintain
an instantaneous communication with each other around the world through
television and the Internet, we continue to fight senseless wars and to oppress one
another cruelly and without regret. In the absence of the sacred, human life, and all
other life, is simply another means to achieve our personal objectives, and to try to
fill our emptiness.
Tagore feared that technology and consumerism would transform the entire planet
into what he described as the “feast . . . of grossness.” This result could be avoided,
he argued, only if human beings learned once again to enjoy and love one another,
and the rest of creation. Tagore equated the sacred with the joy of discovering the
29

achieve personal meaning, enlightenment and fulfillment; one may, in a simpler sense, achieve
peace.147

B. The First Assault on the Sacred
The splitting of the Wyandot tribe, fostered by the dissolution provision of the Treaty of
1855,148 the tribal resumption Treaty of 1867,149 the post-Civil War movement of citizen Wyandots
to Oklahoma, and their adoption back into the resurrected tribe, resulted in an 1881 membership

mysterious unity in diversity of the universe. For him, and I believe for the majority
of indigenous peoples, the sacred was not terrifying and threatening, but joyful and
filled with song. The sacred is the joy of discovering how we are not alone, and
have no need for loneliness.
Id, at 30 – 31.
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Black Elk spoke to Joseph Epes Brown about the peace and fulfillment within the sacred.
“You have noticed that everything an Indian does is in a circle, and that is because
the Power of the World always works in circles, and everything tries to be round.
In the old days when we were a strong and happy people, all our power came to us
from the sacred hoop of the nation, and so long as the hoop was unbroken, the
people flourished. The flowering tree was the living center of the hoop, and the
circle of the four quarters nourished it. The east gave peace and light, the south gave
warmth, the west gave rain, and the north with its cold and mighty wind gave
strength and endurance. This knowledge came to us from the outer world with our
religion. Every-thing the Power of the World does is done in a circle. The sky is
round, and I have heard that the earth is round like a ball, and so are all the stars.
The wind, in its greatest power, whirls. Birds make their nests in circles, for theirs
is the same religion as ours. The sun comes forth and goes down again in a circle.
The moon does the same, and both are round. Even the seasons form a great circle
in their changing, and always come back again to where they were. The life of a
man is a circle from childhood to childhood, and so it is in everything where power
moves. Our teepees were round like the nests of birds, and these were always set in
a circle, the nation’s hoop, a nest of many nests, where the Great Spirit meant for
us to hatch our children.”
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of 292.150 A number of the citizen and non-citizen Wyandots in Kansas never moved to Oklahoma
or rejoined the Wyandot tribe. Instead they remained in the Kansas City, Kansas area, and
maintained both their own version of the tribal customs and their close relationship with sacred
grounds at Huron Indian Cemetery.151
By 1890 Kansas City, Kansas had become not just a jumping-off place for the west; but a
vibrant destination in its own right. The increasing land values at its center became focused on the
open lands of the cemetery. Kansas senator Preston Plumb hit upon the idea of having Congress
declare the cemetery a nuisance, then removing the bodies to a better (and less valuable) place and
selling the site for development.152 The designation of nuisance was and is a frequent ploy of urban
entrepreneurs and their legislative accomplices as, if unchallenged, it avoids the pesky
inconvenience of the takings clause, contract clause, and the due process clause.153 Cases of the
time, prior to Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon,154 dealt with these issues usually under substantive
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THE EMIGRANT TRIBES, supra note 58, at 421
For a number of years, citizens continued to be adopted back into the Wyandot
tribe, and familiar names again began to dominate on the council. By 1881, ten
years after reorganization, the tribal roster stood at 292, but by then included a
number of individuals who lived somewhere other than the new reserve. Many
Citizen Class Wyandots and their descendants never moved to Indian Territory and
were never readmitted to the reorganized tribe. As Indian Agent H.W. Jones had
feared, this eventually resulted in the splitting of families .A substantial number of
Citizen Class Wyandots continued to live in the Kansas City area, but eventually
Wyandot descendents were scatted all across the country.

151

Id; See also JAN ENGLISH, supra note 45 at 551 – 552.

152

DAYTON, supra note 49, at 12.

153

BARLOW BURKE, THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, 3rd Ed., 39 (2013)
(Hereinafter, BURKE).
154

260 US 393 (1922).
31

due process, and sustained extreme urban exercises of authority, as long as, arguably, the purpose
was legitimate and the means reasonable.155
The anomaly, however, of having the legal trustee of reserved property declare that the
beneficial interest is a nuisance was too much even for the often- expedient morality of Washington
in the 1890’s, and Plumb’s subterfuge was rejected.156 The attempt was not unnoticed, however,
and the Wyandot community of Kansas voiced strong disapproval. Lucy Armstrong wrote, in June
of 1890,
“To remove the burying ground would be to scatter the dust of the dead to the
winds. Such a sale is repugnant to every sentiment we cherish for our dead, as well
as being offensive to the highest impulses of a Christian nation.”157
The lives and the fortunes of the preservationists are never easy. To preserve a scarce
resource, or a unique, sacred site requires incessant vigilance. Transformative forces of growth
and neglect never sleep; they may be resisted, perhaps many times, but they never cease. The single
time that they penetrate the shield of protection is almost always the last. The priceless, the
vulnerable, the rare and the sacred are lost; and like extinction, the loss is forever.158
It is even more troubling when an ally loses his way. William Elsey Connelley was a
significant historian of Indian Kansas and the Wyandots in particular.159 However his economic
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desires took precedence over his morality and his art, at least at times. In 1898 he presented the
Oklahoma Wyandotte Tribe with a real estate proposal involving the strategic site occupied by the
Huron Indian Cemetery.160 The Wyandotte Tribal Council gave Connelley the power of attorney
to move the bodies and sell the reserve for a commission of fifteen percent of the sale price. 161 In
1906 Congress passed an appropriations bill which included a hidden rider that authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to provide for removal of the bodies and the sale of the site.162 The
Secretary then appointed commissioners who came to Kansas City, Kansas and prepared to
contract for the removal and reburial of the remains, and for the property itself.163
The plans of Connelley, the Oklahoma Wyandots and the Department of the Interior were
disrupted, however, by the intervention of the Conley sisters-Eliza (Lyda) and Helena (Lena). The
sisters were direct descendants of numerous Wyandots buried in the cemetery including parents,
grandparents and even the great chief Tarhe, and had cousins and a sister buried there as well.164
They undertook the duty of protection in the most direct of manners; they built a shack in the
cemetery and moved in with shotguns and a steely resolve. They hung a sign saying “Trespass at
your peril”165 and Lyda declared “…woe be the man that first attempts to steal a body…(we) are
160

THE EMIGRANT TRIBES, supra note 58, at 421; DAYTON, supra note 49, at 13;
“Connelley, who is still infamous among local historians for his entrepreneurial
skills, must have felt very pleased with himself. He was on the verge, he believed,
of accomplishing what the great Senator Plumb could not- the sale of the “eyesore”
that was the Huron Place Cemetery.”
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part owners of the ground and have right…to keep off trespassers, the right a man has to shoot a
burglar who enters his home.”166 Helena, self-professed to be a sorceress, cursed those who would
disturb the graves, and today is buried in the cemetery with a tombstone warning “Cursed be the
villain that molests their graves.”167
It’s noteworthy that Lyda Conley’s defense contained, in addition, a legal foundation: an
assertion of ownership and a night of resistance against trespass that could extend, perhaps, to the
use of deadly force. The origin of such rather nuanced legal accompaniment to otherwise dire
physical threats was Lyda’s rather formidable education, unique enough for a woman at the
frontiers’ edge at the end of the 19th century, and even more so far a woman of Indian origin.

166

JAN ENGLISH, supra note 45, at 553; See also Robert Downs, “From Petticoats to Briefs; A
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Id, at 1016.
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Jay Lastelic, “Curse May Play a Role in Cemetery Combat”, Kansas City Star and Times, 2
(May 17, 1959), reprint at; http://www.wyandot.org/curse.htm,
“Miss Conley said the power of the curse was transmitted to her by a woman of the
tribe, known as a witch who is buried in the cemetery.
"She asked me," Miss Conley used to tell, "if I would rather have power or money.
I said power." . . .
‘My father’s spirit came to me in a dream and was unhappy and I knew what that
meant,’ Helena said then, ‘The dead want this holy place defended and it will be.’
Helena Conley was the last survivor of the family. She died September 15, 1958,
at the age of 94. Often she wondered about her longevity.
‘Our body has to return to mother earth and our spirit to God who made it’, she
said. ‘We don’t know how we came here, nor why, nor where we go. I don’t know
why I’m left in this God-forsaken place. It’s a cursed world - a separation from
God.’

Id, at 2.
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Lyda had rowed a boat daily across the Missouri River to attend Park College, 168 and, in
1900, had entered Kansas City College of Law, later to become the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law.169 She graduated in 1902, one of four women in a class of sixty seven, and
was admitted to the Missouri Bar. She was the first Indian woman attorney in the United States to
argue before the United States Supreme Court. 170
She eschewed her formal training at the outset of the assault on the Cemetery, and opted
for direct self-help which proved effective in the immediate sense-a sort of de facto temporary
restraining order. The Interior Commission, unable to arrange a sale, left for Washington emptyhanded, tails clamped firmly between their legs. They had been deterred by both direct force, and
by the ground swell of popular support for the courageous “Conley girls.” – but they had not been
defeated.171 The threats posed by the Act of 1906 was still in place and, for this Sword of
Damocles, Lyda turned to her legal training. On June 11, 1907 she filed suit in federal court to
enjoin James Garfield, the Secretary of the Interior, from executing the statutory authorization of
sale.172 The district court rather summarily dismissed her pleadings for lack of jurisdiction, but
allowed appeal, which would lead to argument before the United States Supreme Court173. Though
she did not get any traction in the lower court, Conley had introduced some interestingly ideas that
would come to fruition and play later roles in the federal Indian Law.
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Lyda Conley, by seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior’s disposal of Indian land,
had drawn a vital distinction between the authority of the executive to extinguish Indian title, and
the authority of Congress. Case law would come later to confirm that only Congress has this
authority. Lane v. Santa Rosa held that the Secretary of the Interior had no inherent authority to
dispose of Pueblo lands, in disregard of Indian ownership174, even if the Indians were in generally
deemed wards,175 subject to guardianship. Congress, on the other hand, had the plenary power to
abrogate a treaty and extinguish Indian title.176 Though Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock177 suggested that
Indian interests in lands might not be within the protection of the Fifth Amendment,178 the case
ultimately decided that the actions of Congress, in abrogation and allocation of treaty lands, were
not an unconstitutional taking but were “a mere change in the form of investment” and presumed
to be “in perfect good faith.”179 Subsequent cases in the twentieth century made it clear, however,
that Indian treaty land was property protected by the Fifth Amendment, and that Congress’s
administrative transformations must in fact be in good faith to earn managerial discretion on the
form and results of investment.180 In United States v. Sioux Nations of Indians,181 the Court said,
which respect to the seizure, under duress of starvation, of the Black Hills in 1877:
“In sum, we conclude that the legal analysis and factual finding of the Court of
Claims fully support its conclusion that the terms of the 1877 Act did not effect “a
174
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mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property.” Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S., at 568, 23 S.Ct., at 222. Rather, the 1877 Act effected a taking
of tribal property, property which had been set aside for the exclusive occupation
of the Sioux by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. That taking implied an obligation
on the part of the Government to make just compensation to Sioux Nation, and that
obligation, including an award of interest, must now, at last, be paid.”182
Conley asserted in the federal courts that a Wyandot Indian with citizenship had an
individualized standing based on a “seizin and a legal estate” in the cemetery land.183 In a related
sense, she was also contending status as a third party beneficiary of the Treaty of 1855 between
the United States and the simultaneously terminated Wyandot Tribe. These rights in land and
contract would be secured, she asserted, under both the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
taking without due process, and under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.184
The claim of a personal legal estate, based on the burial of ancestors, even on land held in
trust or fee by another, has a resonance that increases during the 20th century. Cases from the
common or civil law have declared descendants’ interest in the unabandoned bodies of ancestors
buried on private land of another.185 After 1990, the Native American Grave Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)186 provided a statutory declaration that lineal descendants have
priority in the control of remains that are found on federal or tribal lands,187 or in the legal custody
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of a federally-funded museum.188 The linkage of NAGPRA to the Huron Indian Cemetery was to
reemerge at the end of the 20th Century.189
Conley’s assertion of third party beneficiary status under a treaty with a terminated tribe,
also surfaces again in the Post World War II termination era when Congress severed relations with
a number of recognized tribes.190 Subsequently, a number of cases emerged when individual
members of the former tribes successfully asserted individualized rights in treaty promises
regarding hunting, fishing, and jurisdiction.191
Conley, and other Kansas Wyandots were, likewise, claiming standing with regard to
personal interests in ancestral remains in the aftermath of the termination of the treaty tribe. But,
there was a significant difference that made their argument even stronger. Not only were the rights
under the Treaty of 1855 essentially individual ones, as they related to the burials and interest of
lineal descendants, but, in addition, the termination of the treaty tribe was not later, in the future,
it was simultaneous with ratification of the treaty. Individualization of rights in the Huron Indian
Cemetery was present from the outset.
There may be another modern parallel to Lyda Conley’s argument for personal standing in
treaty land cases. Aboriginal, pre-treaty rights in land are clearly dealt with as a tribal claim,192 and
individuals have never been able to make a claim for tribal aboriginal rights.193 Individual Indians
have, however, been able to establish protectable rights in land to which the United States holds
188
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legal title, sometimes called individual aboriginal rights.194 The individual must be able to
demonstrate actual, exclusive occupation since time immemorial or, more realistically, since
before the operation of United States land management law.195
It might have been argued by Lyda Conley, that since the Wyandot Treaty of 1855 and the
dissolution of the Tribe, the federal government has held legal title to the Huron Indian
Reservation, at least until the 1867 treaty,196 without an indicated tribal beneficiary. There was,
however, from 1843 until 1867, an actual, exclusive occupation of a defined portion of the land by
various sets of remains, and by the visitation of descendants. Lyda Conley was the direct inheritor
of the actual, exclusive, individualized occupation of her ancestors and, under cases like Dann and
Cramer,197 she could have had standing before the federal courts to protect her possessory and
visitation rights.
One further development in Indian sacred site law has recently emerged and might have
provided Conley with standing to enjoin disinterment. In the late 1970’s, Indian tribes began to
invoke the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause in cases where government management of the
federal public lands threatened religious sites with substantial burdens.198 These cases, at first
unsuccessful, employed the logic of Sherbert v. Verner199 which held that governmental actions
and regulations that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion are presumed invalid unless
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shown to further compelling state interests with the least restrictive means.200 The first major
victory for the tribes was in N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson201 where the Ninth
Circuit found that a proposed logging road, on non-tribal land in a national forest, would virtually
destroy the tribes’ ability to practice religion.202 The Supreme Court reversed, however, in Lyng v.
N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.203 The Court held that a prima facie violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, necessitating a compelling state interest for validity, would require a showing of
intentional discrimination, prohibition or coercion of belief. Indirect impacts of government land
management would not, even if devastating to a sacred site, be enough to trigger strict scrutiny.204
Employment Division v. Smith205 went beyond Lyng’s focus on public land management
and held that governmental actions would be judged on the reasonable basis test and not under
strict scrutiny, if the substantial burden “is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental
impact of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision”206 Congress responded to the scope
of Smith by passing the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) which professed to
“restore207 the compelling state interest test208 as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.”
The Supreme Court was not amused by the attempted overrule of Smith and charged
Congress with an unauthorized use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section Five enforcement
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power; at least with respect to state and local governments.209 RFRA continued to be applicable to
the federal government, as Congress can police itself under Article I plenary power, without
recourse to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment210. RFRA’s use for strict scrutiny protection
of tribal sacred sites was, however, undercut by a split in the lower courts. The Ninth Circuit read
“substantial burden” as unchanged from Lyng211 and, thus, still demanding of a showing of
intentional discrimination, prohibition or coercion of belief before strict scrutiny would be
forthcoming.212 An Oklahoma district court case, however, allowed a prima facie case under
RFRA to be made on a basis of a substantial, though indirect, exercise of adjacent land
management.213
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby214 seems to stretch the
reach of the RFRA and the compelling interest test to the far edges of substantial burden,215 as well
as extending religious-based standing beyond tribes and individuals to corporations.216 Under the
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Oklahoma district court ruling in Comanche217 and clearly under Burwell, Lyda Conley could have
established standing by asserting that the federal disinterment of her ancestors, and sale of sacred
burial ground was a substantial, devastating burden on religious practice, even if not intentionally
designed to prohibit or coerce belief. She would have had a basis for injunction unless the
government could show a compelling state interest and no less restrictive means.
But the reality of time over a century ago intrudes on revery. Let us explore what Oliver
Wendell Holmes and the Supreme Court did in 1910.

C. Conley v. Ballinger218-The Supreme Courts Weighs In
To raise the substance of issues that might merit equitable relief in federal court, Lyda
Conley needed to first to demonstrate justiciability sufficient to satisfy the constitution. In
particular, she had to show that the federal law authorizing the sale of Huron Cemetery was an
imminent threat to a legally protected interest, and might thus deprive her of her property without
due process of law.219 She reiterated some of her arguments below that she was both a citizen of
the State of Kansas and a descendent of Wyandot tribal members who signed the Treaty of 1855,
and parents who were buried in the cemetery. She asserted possessory right on that basis alone,
and additionally asserted rights as a third party beneficiary of the treaty.220
Holmes marginalized Lyda’s seisin argument by expanding it beyond realistic application.
“The allegation of plaintiff’s interest plainly does not mean that she has taken possession of the
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whole burying ground, and has acquired seisin of the whole by wrong.”221 He then focused on the
idea of a third party beneficial interest in severalty, established by the treaty.
“The argument that vested rights were conferred upon individuals by that treaty,
stated as strongly as we can state it, would be that, as the tribe was to be dissolved
by the treaty, it cannot have been the beneficiary of the agreement for the permanent
appropriation of the land in question as a public burying ground, that the language
used imported a serious undertaking, and that to give it force as such the United
States must be taken to have declared a trust. If a trust was declared, the benefit by
it must have been limited to the members of the integrated tribe...and their
representatives, whether as individuals or as a limited public, and this it might be
possible to work out a right of property in the plaintiff, as a first step towards
maintaining her bill.”222
Holmes rejected this approach with a tautology. “but we do not pursue the attempt to state
the argument on that side because we are of the opinion that it is plainly impossible for the plaintiff
to prevail.”223 The “plain impossibility” was not only defused by subsequent cases such as
Menominee Tribe v. United States,224 but was inconsistent with Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,225 which
Holmes saw as precedent. Holmes felt that, under Lone Wolf, the United States remained a trustee
of the cemetery, even after the dissolution of the tribe, but not a trustee for the citizen descendents
of ancestors, buried in the reserved land. Rather, it was a trustee for Indian wards, and this could
include the new tribe recognized in 1867, regardless of its identity with the tribe that signed the
Treaty of 1855. As trustee for the new ward, the United States had, under Lone Wolf, the power
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to change or transmute the land interest reserved and hold the monetary return for the new
members.
“The government cannot be suppose to have abandoned merely for a moment and
for a secondary matter its general attitude toward the Indians as wards over whom
and whose property it retained unusual powers, so long as they remained set apart
from the body of the people. The very treaty of 1867, cited in the bill, providing for
the resumption of the tribal mode of life by the Wyandottes, shows that the United
States assumed still to possess such unusual powers. It seems to us that the
reasonable interpretation of the language as to the burying ground is…that the
words, ‘shall be permanently reserved and appropriated for that purpose,’ like the
rest of the treaty, were addresses only to the tribe, and rested for their fulfillment
on the good faith of the United States,-a good faith that would not be broken by a
change believed by Congress to be for the welfare of the Indians.
We are driven to the conclusion that…the United States retained the same power
that it would have had if the Wyandotte tribe had continued in existence after the
treaty of 1855; that the only rights in and over the cemetery were tribal rights; and
that the plaintiff cannot establish a legal or equitable title…or indeed any right to
have the cemetery remain undisturbed by the United States.”226
The doctrine of the unreviewable discretion of the federal trustee to transmute Indian ward
trust assets without constitutional consequence, sustained in the notorious Lone Wolf case,227 but
overturned in the United States v. Sioux Nation,228 was allowed to expand its reach. It now
permitted the federal courts to extend wardship in an inchoate form beyond the dissolution of the
treaty tribe, to apply it in favor of new wards in a new tribe which favored the exchange of treaty
lands for money, and to deny the justiciability of inherently individualized treaty rights of
descendants to the sanctity of the very burials that held their ancestors’ bodies.

D. The Various Failures to Sell Huron Indian Cemetery
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The Supreme Court’s opinion let stand the lower court’s denial of an injunction against the
legislation authorizing the sale of the cemetery so that the threat persisted, as did the resistance of
the unrepentant Conleys as well as the Kansas Wyandot community.229 McIntyre Armstrong
despaired,
“Huron cemetery is to be sold. The government has broken every treaty it has
made with the Indians and they have been driven from place to place until even
the dead are not allowed to rest in peace.”230
The Wyandots, however, managed to enlist the support of Senator Charles Curtis, who was
of Indian descent when it was to his advantage.231 He convinced his colleagues that it would be
better to retain the cemetery as a monument than to sell it. Congress, in 1913, repealed the
legislation authorizing the sale of the cemetery and recommended that it become a national
monument.232 Three years later, it authorized $10,000 for improvements to the grounds and
contracted with Kansas to “forever maintain, care for and preserve Huron Cemetery.”233 The
Conley sisters, who had failed to achieve third party beneficiary standing under the treaty, did not
place full trust in this legislative pledge either. They continued to respond with direct action to the
practical realities and the corrosive forces of neglect, vandalism, and opportunism. They cared for
the birds and squirrels, chased away trespassers, pulled up surveyor stats and even served time (ten
days) for disturbing the peace.234
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On May 28, 1946, Lyda Conley died at the age of 92 and was buried in the Huron Cemetery
next to her parents.235 Her sister, Helena, died twelve years later and was likewise buried with her
family and a gravestone reading “Floating Voice…Cursed be the villain that molests these
graves”236 Their deaths, in part, lowered the preservationist guard and enabled the inexorable
growth forces to rekindle.
In 1947 and 1949 Senate bills were introduced which called for, again, a sale of the
cemetery and the distribution of the proceeds to the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma.237 The
Wyandottes had, in 1937, incorporated under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, 238 and
under their constitution, only those on the roll in Oklahoma in 1937 were eligible to be tribal
members.239 The Senate bills—as well as the Wyandottes’ exclusionary policies – provoked strong
opposition from the Kansas Wyandot community, and the introduction of House Bill 3659 to make
the cemetery a National Monument.240 Though neither billed passed, the post-War winds of change
were blowing.
The first to feel them, ironically, was not the cemetery but the driving force from
Oklahoma. In 1956, Congress terminated the Oklahoma Wyandottes from federal recognition and
supervision.241 Termination was similar to Nineteenth Century allotment in that it was designed to
weaken if not necessarily to end tribalism. It went even further by literally purporting to end the
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special federal relationship and protective duties.242 The purpose, often dramatically stated, was to
set the Indians free of the federal custodial yoke, in a manner similar to the Emancipation
Proclamation.243 More precisely, the termination of federal trusteeship would end special
protection for Indian property, such as the Non Intercourse Acts restraint on alienability, and
subject both the tribe and its property to state law and taxation.244 Though sometimes the
terminated tribes got direct control of their property, freed from federal supervision, in other cases
the federal government preempted the ownership, and sold the property as a part of termination
with cash distributions to be made to individual tribal members.245
Under Section 5 of the Termination Law246, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to
transfer title to Huron Cemetery to a corporation organized by the tribe for management or sale
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Senator Arthur Watkins stated;
“In view of the historic policy of Congress favoring freedom for the Indians, we
may well expect future Congresses to continue to endorse the principle that ‘as
rapidly as possible’ we should end the status of Indians as wards of the Government
and grant them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.
“With the aim of ‘equality before the law’ in mind our course should rightly be no
other. Firm and constant consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us
all to work diligently and carefully for the full realization of their national
citizenship with all other Americans. Following footsteps of the Emancipation
Proclamation of 94 years ago, I see the following words emblazoned in letter of fire
above the heads of the Indians – “These people shall be free!”
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at

http://www.wyandotte-

and distribution among the members.247 This was an ironic twist on an all-too-frequent pattern of
termination where a termination tribe lost its land base- its sovereign, economic, political and
cultural center- in exchange for relatively small distributions of cash. These were quickly spent on
maintenance, leaving the individuals unbuffered and without a cohesive center.
“The check did not compensate for the loss of federal benefits of the new tax
burdens. It could not pay for the loss of tribal governmental authority, or
compensate for the discrimination that followed in the state agencies and courts.
Perhaps most tragic of all, the check could not possibly pay for the psychological
costs of ‘not being an Indian anymore.’”248
In the case of the Wyandottes of Oklahoma, the terminated tribe got the right to sell
reserved land in another state that had been abandoned and never used by the Oklahoma tribe, but
which was the center of the cultural, spiritual and community life of the Kansas Wyandots who
had never left, and who had guarded the cemetery with unceasing passion.249
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887, entitled “Wyandotte Tribe Termination of Federal Supervision.” But last week
Kansas’ Senators and Representatives discovered they should have been listening
to the rustling in the woods. Public Law 887 gives the Wyandotte Indian tribe of
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George Zane Jr., the Kansas Wyandots, and the City of Kansas City, Kansas filed suit in
the federal district court of Kansas to enjoin both the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma and Fred
Seaton, the Secretary of the Interior from selling the Huron Place Cemetery and removing the
bodies for reburial in another place.250 The Court noted the clear division between the interests of
the Oklahoma Tribe and the plaintiffs. The Kansas Wyandots desperately wanted to continue the
use and protect the sanctity of the cemetery, while the defendants excluded the Kansas tribe from
membership, had not used the cemetery since their removal to Oklahoma over a hundred years
before, and had no interest in maintaining it as a burial ground.251 But, having observed this, the
Court afforded the plaintiffs no better result than that achieved by Lyda Conley. The Court said:
“If Conley, an individual, had no individual rights under the Treaty which she could enforce in a
court of law, then plaintiffs in this action, and those similarly situated, have no individual rights
which they may enforce herein.”252
But indeed, things had changed since Conley v. Ballinger. The Fifth Amendment right to
just compensation for takings of treaty rights questioned in Lone Wolf,253 was distinctly confirmed
in a serious of Supreme Court cases including. United States v. Creek Nation,254 LanE v. Pueblo
of Santa Rosa255 and Shoshone Tribe v. United States.256 Secondly, the individual assertion of
certain severable treaty guarantees such as hunting and fishing rights, and ancestral grave sites
Id, accessed at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,893532,00. Html
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seemed increasingly clear. Indeed the Supreme Court, shortly after this case, recognized the
continuing validity of constitutionally protected tribal hunting and fishing rights after
termination,257 and lower courts specifically viewed the protection as individualized as well as
tribal.258
In United States v. Felter259, a Tenth Circuit case paralleling the Wyandotte situation in
several aspects, the court examined the Ute Termination Act of 1954,260 which terminated the
mixed-blood Utes, and continued recognition of the full-bloods. The court held, equal protection
considerations aside, that individuals among the terminated mixed-bloods retained the rights to
hunt and fish on the Uintah Reservation, even if the full-bloods retained ownership and sovereign
power.261 Likewise, even the sovereign ownership of treaty rights to the cemetery by the Oklahoma
Wyandottes should not preempt the right of individual Kansas Wyandots to assert constitutionally
protected property rights in the remains of their ancestors and their particular gravesites.262
257
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The court held that the canons of construction favored the claims of the terminated mixed-blood
Ute individuals.
“We reject the Government’s position that this canon is inapplicable to mixedblood Ute Indians because they are like “ordinary American citizens.” Unlike the
“ordinary American citizen,” these mixed-blood Ute Indians enjoyed the right to
hunt and fish on the reservation before passage of the 1954 Act. Following the
teaching of the Supreme court in Menominee Tribe, we decline to construe the 1954
Act “as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these
Indians” in the absence of an “explicit statement” in the 1954 Act abrogating these
rights.”
Id.
262
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Perhaps, in the Tenth Circuit, this would not prevent a decision by the Oklahoma Wyandottes to
disinter and rebury,263 but it would not preclude the standing of the Kansas Wyandot descendants
to seek an injunction.
After the Supreme Court refused to overturn the three-judge district courts’ dismissal of
the Wyandot suit264 or reconsider Conley v. Ballinger, the fate of the cemetery remained in limbo.
No buyers emerged, no attempts at disinterment were made and, although the Oklahoma
Wyandottes and the Department of the Interior remained interested in sale, and reburial, there was
a growing movement for preservation.

Chapter 5: Historic Preservation Comes to
Kansas City, Kansas- Sort of
As the United States began its extrication from the grinding futility of the war in Vietnam,
it turned its attention toward the seemingly more relevant and tractable problems of the domestic
environment, poverty and discrimination. Part of the refocus was on historic preservation which
had some successful local precedents in well-known venues like Williamsburg, Charleston, New
Orleans and Santa Fe.265 These cities made a special use of zoning power-sometimes on their own
263

See Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996)
“ . . .Christian beliefs in the sanctity of burial sites are not violated by moving
gravesites when necessary, and moving the gravesites would not be inconsistent
with tenets of American Indian spirituality if the Thirys believed it to be necessary.
Although a site for prayer and worship is important to Quakers, a basic tenet of
Quakerism is that God is within individuals and one particular location is no more
or less sacred than another. Despite their beliefs in the sanctity of burial sites, the
Thirys would agree to move their child’s grave if they believed that it was required
in order to build a safe highway.”
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PRESERVATION LAW, 4-5 (2012)(Hereinafter, BRONIN and BYRNE).
51

initiative and sometimes with authorization from state constitutions or enabling legislation- to
protect landmarks and historic districts threatened by the pace and insensitivity of growth,
redevelopment and decay.266 The inspiration for historic preservation was, in central part,
educational and cultural. It manifested a concern with time and the past, with history and with
context, and with the vulnerability of iconic and anachronistic benchmarks to the relentless costbenefit, dollar-based calculus, and the pursuit of profits and growth.267 Historic urban protection,
however, had its own economic potential as landmarks and historic districts could attract tourism
and could generate internal synergy that might dilute the forces of inner city decay and might
counter the centrifugal tendencies toward suburbia.268
In 1966, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 269 which aided
local preservation efforts in several distinct ways. In one thrust, the Act established the National
Register of Historic Places, and a process for inclusion.270 The Register automatically lists National
Historic Sites and Landmarks designated under the Historic Sites Act of 1935,271 and other historic
areas within the National Park Systems.272 Future nominations can be presented by federal
agencies, state historic preservation officers and tribal historic preservation officers who identify
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potentially eligible buildings, districts or sites within the jurisdictions.273 National Register criteria,
at least one of which must be met, include: a property making a contribution to a major pattern of
American history, a building with distinctive architecture or construction, a property associated
with the life of a significant person in history, or a site that has provided or may provided important
historical of prehistorical information.274
The criteria are developed and applied by the National Park Service, and state and tribal
historic preservation officers.275 Cemeteries are presumptively excluded from eligibility on the
National Register,276 but the National Park Service may make an exception for
“A cemetery that derives its primary significance from the graves of persons of
transcendent importance, from age, from distinctive design features or from
association with historic events…”277
This exception clearly could reach the Huron Indian Cemetery and, on September 3, 1971,
it was listed on the National Register.278 This alone does not assure protection as the owner remains
legally free to modify or demolish the inclusion, or even delist the site.279 There is however, some
indirect federal protection afforded by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.280
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This section, procedural in nature rather than substantive, requires federal agencies to take account
of the impact of their undertakings, such as direct action, financing or regulation, affecting
properties on or eligible for the National Register.281 If a federal agency undertaking could have
an effect on a listed site such as the Huron Indian Cemetery, than the agency is obligated to consult
with the state or tribal historic preservation officers and possibly the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation (ACHP).282 Consultation generally leads to a memorandum of agreement outlining
measures to avoid or limit the adverse effects.283
Theoretically, a failure to reach agreement, even after the commentary of the ACHP, is not
substantively binding on an unrepentant agency, but the procedure and the considerations are
mandatory.284 Furthermore, the NHPA allows both the ACHP as well as the agencies to
promulgate binding rules and regulations on the implementation of Section 106,285 and some of
these regulations may go beyond procedure to substantive demand.286
Still, even assuming that any federal agency involved with a covered undertaking has
complied with the procedures of Section 106 and its own formally adopted regulations, the
undissuaded property owner, without more, remains free to undertake his desired
transformation.287 But there can be, and often is more. Direct substantive restraints against
modification or demolition of historic structures may be provided by state statutes or local
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preservation ordinances that are keyed to inclusions on the National Register and the National Park
Services’ criteria, as well as the standards of the enacting body. This is, in fact, the situation in
Kansas City, Kansas with respect to the Huron Indian Cemetery. Kansas City adopted its first
historic preservation ordinance in 1970,288 and a year later, listed the Huron Indian Cemetery
among its first inclusions.289
The ordinance would seem on its face to provide complete substantive protection for its
inclusions. It states
“It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, reconstruct, structurally alter,
remodel, renovate, restore, demolish, raze, maintain, excavate, zone, or place signs
in or on any historic landmark within a historic district in violation of the provisions
of this article.”290

This prohibition must, however be read in conjunction with the Kansas Historic
Preservation Statute291 which states,
The state or any political subdivision of the state, or any instrumentality thereof,
shall not undertake any project which will damage or destroy any historic property
included in the national register of historic places or the state register of historic
places until the state historic preservation officer has been given notice, as provided
herein, and an opportunity to investigate and comment upon the proposed project.
If the state historic preservation officer determines, with or without having been
given notice of the proposed project, that the proposed project will damage or
destroy any historic property include in the national register of historic places or
the state register of historic places the project shall not proceed until
...
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the governing body of the political subdivision, in the case of a project of a political
subdivision or an instrumentality thereof, has made a determination, based on a
consideration of all relevant factors, that there is no feasible and prudent alternative
to the proposal and that the program includes all possible planning to minimize
harm to such historic property resulting from such use.292
The ability of a property owner to contend that the ordinance and the statute bear so heavily
on the possible utility of the property that there are no feasible and prudent economic options left
means that the government may have to afford a variance to avoid the finding of an
unconstitutional inverse condemnation.293

Chapter 6: Leaford Bearskin and The Rising Tide
of the Indian Gaming
A. A Casino on Stilts?
Leaford Bearskin was born in 1921 on his family’s Indian allotment, and grew up near the
Oklahoma Wyandotte Reservation – or what was left of it.294 The Oklahoma Wyandotte, after
emigration from Kansas, acquired 21,000 acres in Northeastern Oklahoma Indian Territory after
the Civil War.295 This was dissipated into individual allotments to 214 tribal members by 1893.296
Though the tribe was recognized by the United States and organized under the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act (in 1937)297 the tribal holdings had withered away to 287 acres in 1971 when Bearskin
292
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returned from forty years of military service.298 Bearskin had been a war hero and had retired as a
Lt. Colonel. He had flown 46 combat missions, in World War II, participated in Berlin air lift,
been a squadron commander in Korea, and had won, among numerous citations, the Distinguished
Flying Cross and the Medal for Humane Action.299
Bearskin was, in sum, a tough, competent, disciplined man, and he was disturbed by the
desuetude he found in his home country.300 Bearskin resolved to use his leadership skills, practical
education, and familiarity with the connections beyond the insularities of the tribal world to revive
the Wyandotte culture, identity and pride. He rightly believed that economy on a sovereign land
base was essential for the renaissance.
Upon his election to chief, in 1983, he revised the tribal constitution and began the
restructuring and expansion of the desultory business and service activities.301 He pursued the
capital needed for physical improvements; instituted legal proceedings for land payments owed by
the United States, and, in addition, began focusing on the issues and potential for Indian gaming.302
Gambling began to emerge in the 1980’s as the new “white buffalo”,303 portending an
economic survival on Indian reservations desperate for self-sufficiency. Many tribes had been
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severely handicapped by truncated land holdings that inhibited traditional economies such as
hunting, gathering, ranching and even agriculture. Compounding the economic complexities for
many tribalists was the isolation from most national business centers and the unavailability of easy
access to a cash economy. Gaming, however, might provide a low investment means of attracting
some of the urban consumers to the forbidden fruit of gaming made legal within the cocoon of
tribal sovereignty.304 Money from the gaming could pay for the prizes, cover the labor and
overhead, and provide a surplus for the rebuilding of tribal government and culture.305
In the early 1980’s, Seminole Indians in Florida decided to open a bingo hall on their
reservation, and offer games with higher prizes, better hours and stronger refreshments than those
offered at the area churches where state law limited jackpots, and the Bible counseled
temperance.306
States, made more nervous by the competition than the taint of decadence, pursed litigation
– which was unsuccessful as long as the state did not prohibit gambling altogether but permitted
gaming in some form, even if not as full-blown as on the reservations.307 In 1981, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Florida held that bingo games on federally-recognized reservations were
immune from Florida jurisdiction.308 Six years later, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission

“Tribal gaming has frequently been compared to the buffalo as it has successfully
fed, clothed, and sheltered numerous tribal communities, and generally improved
the quality of life on many reservations. Tribal gaming has changed the lives of
countless Native Americans by giving tribes a real opportunity to be economically
independent. Johnson, supra, at 101.
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Indians,309 the United States Supreme Court confirmed that, when states allow gaming in some
form, and do not prohibit it in its entirety, efforts to regulate and restrict more extensive tribal
gaming are necessarily civil in nature. This means that such state efforts are not included within
the grants of criminal jurisdiction over tribes made to states under Public Law 280.310
The ensuing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA)311 was not so much a grant of
gaming authority to tribes, which seemed to already possess this power within their retained
sovereignty, as it was a comprehensive but restrictive approach that would balance tribal
sovereignty and economic needs against state desires to regulate competition in an enterprise it
was not willing to criminalize and prohibit.312
One of the keystones to gaming under the IGRA is “Indian lands” which means:
“all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and . . .
any land . . . held in trust by the United States for the benefit
of any Indian tribe or individual . . . and over which an Indian
Tribe exercises governmental power.”313
Another requirement for utilization of the IGRA is that the tribe seeking to game is recognition:
“[R]ecognized as eligible . . . for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians and . . . is recognized as
possessing the powers of self government.”314
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480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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480 U.S. at 202.

311

25 U.S.C. § 2701 et.seq.
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See MASON, supra note 305 at 45; See also G. WILLIAM RICE, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL
GAMING LAW, 71 (2006) (Hereinafter, RICE).
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25 U.S.C. Section 2703(4).
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25 U.S.C. § 2703(5).
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The Oklahoma Wyandotte Tribe has twice been recognized as a partner in a nation-tonation relationship315, and is thus capable of both receiving special programs and services, and
exercising the powers of self-government.316 It holds reservation land in Oklahoma that is capable
of supporting class III casino gaming under the IGRA317 and which does in fact house the
Wyandotte Nation Casino.318 However, a major key to successful gaming is location in or near a
substantial metropolitan area, and the reservation headquarters in Wyandotte, Oklahoma are
almost 200 miles from Wichita, Kansas and 100 miles from Tulsa which are the nearest
metropolitan areas of more than 500,000 people. In addition, the Wyandotte Nation Casino faces
stiff competition from other tribal casinos in more strategic Oklahoma locations.
Leaford Bearskin, however, contemplated an additional angle of attack – reserved land in
a big city market. The Huron Indian Cemetery, in the heart of the Kansas City metropolitan area,
was, by its treaty terms and the rulings of the federal courts, a reservation held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of the Wyandotte Tribe. Not only that, but tribal gaming competitors

315

The tribe was originally recognized in 1937, was terminated in 1956, and was recognized again
in 1978. See supra, notes 237-245 and 25 U.S.C. Section 861 (1978) which repealed the
termination provisions of 25 U.S.C. Sections 791-807 and restored all the rights and privileges of
protecting supervision and recognition to the Wyndottes. It is possible to argue that formal
jurisdictional recognition, on a government-to-government, basis was confirmed conceptionally in
the Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866) and could have been intended by the Wyandot Treaty of
1867, 15 Stat. 513, Article 13. However, research suggests that the concept of jurisdictional
recognition, as opposed to mere cognitive recognition, of a tribe as a tribe, did not become a
centralized concept until the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. See WilliamW. Quinn, Jr.,
“Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a legal
Concept”, 34 Am. J. of legal Hist. 331, 333-332 (1990).
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Id.
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See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(4) and 2703(8); and 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).
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The casino is located at 100 Jackpot place in Wyandotte, Oklahoma, several miles west of the
Indigo Sky Casino, which is owned by the Eastern Shawnee Tribe and sits on the Oklahoma border,
just west of Senaca, Missouri.
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in Kansas were located 90 miles to the northwest on fairly remote, less attractive sites.319 True,
the cemetery was only two acres in size, and thus capable of supporting only a small facility, 320
but, perhaps, it could be a springboard to – or a stalking horse for – a larger complex at a more
compatible site – such as one at the struggling Woodlands race track.321 Woodlands was clearly
not federal property but, perhaps, the Department of the Interior could be induced to acquire
Woodlands in trust under its statutory authority.322 All prospects would stem from a plan-sure to
be controversial-to retrofit the cemetery for gaming.
Bearskin’s first proposal, in February 1994, was to disinter the graves at Huron, rebury
the remains at the nearby Quindaro Cemetery, and then seek a compact with the State for a highstakes bingo parlor on the now secularized premises.323 Almost immediately the Bureau of Indian
Affairs office at Andarko, Oklahoma stated that no action requiring the BIA’s involvement would
occur without “consent from the lineal descendants of individuals interred at the Huron Park
Cemetery, as required in the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990”
(NAGPRA).324
NAGPRA does indeed show distinct, preeminent concern for the lineal descendants of
buried ancestors – but not in the fashion asserted by the Andarko office. The Act was passed, in
substantial part, to deal with the rights of possession to remains discovered on federal or tribal
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The Golden Eagle Casino (Kickapoo Tribe), The Sac and Fox Casino, and The Prairie Band
(Potawatomi) Casino are all located near Horton, Kansas, north of Topeka and west of St. Joseph,
Missouri.
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THE EMIGRANT TRIBES, supra note 58, at 425.
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See JAN ENGLISH, “A Brief Chronological Overview of the Wyandot Nation of Kansas and the
Huron Indian Cemetery”, 1 at http://www.wyandot.org/ cemetery.html (accessed March 21, 2015).
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lands after 1990,325 and to remains and cultural patrimony in the legal custody of federally funded
museums.326 Property rights in such remains and items would indeed be within the priority of
those able to establish lineal descendancy with a preponderance of evidence. 327 Here, however,
the Andarko BIA asserted that lineal descendants would not only have a property priority but, in
addition, a right to insist on nondisturbance – against even a federally recognized tribe with full
beneficial ownership of the site.
NAGPRA does not go this far. Indeed, a federally recognized tribe has sovereign
jurisdiction over reservation land use decisions, and can insist on compliance by others, 328 even
by lineal descendants of a non-recognized tribe like the Kansas Wyandots. The Oklahoma
Wyandottes, willing to transfer possession of the remains, but not sovereignty over land use, were
not precluded either by the language or the intent of NAGPRA. They could have insisted that
disinterment and repatriation of remains at another site take place, and that no non-members, even
if lineal descendants, had the right to prohibit or condition their sovereign discretion.329
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25 U.S.C. § 3002.
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25 U.S.C. § 3005.
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See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 455 F.Supp.2d 1207,
1214-1215 (D. Nev. 2006).
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See e.g. 25 U.S.C. § 470cc(9)(2) which states:
“In the case of any permits for the excavation or removal of any archaeological
resource located on Indian lands, the permit may be granted only after obtaining
the consent of the Indian or Indian tribe owning or having jurisdiction over such
lands. The permit shall include such terms and conditions as may be requested by
such Indian or Indian tribe.”

Since Huron Cemetery is owned by the Oklahoma Wyandottes, and not the Kansas Wyandots, and
since the Oklahoma Wyandottes have jurisdiction, under Conley v. Ballinger, see supra notes 218228, the Kansas Wyandot descendants would have a proprietary interest in remains but no
jurisdiction to resist disinterment.
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Bearskin, however, had his sights set on the bigger prize of the Woodlands, and didn’t
wish to needlessly antagonize the Kansas Wyandots, many of whom were friends and relatives.
Instead, he floated the possibility of a creative use of the unused airspace over the cemetery –
much the same as the proposal by Penn Central Railroad in the classic New York City
Preservation case.330 If the disputed use can be elevated above the ground, then there is no
physical disturbance, only visual or qualitative change. The sacred and profane can be neatly
balanced.
Penn Central wished to build a modern tower over the iconic railroad station, and thus
make physical and financial use of the unused air space extending above the relatively squat
station all the way to the lofty regulatory height limit.331 The City, however, used its historic
preservation ordinance to block not only physical transformation, but also the character –
diminishing indignity of a modern skyscraper on stilts rising over the enfolded landmark.332
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance, though denying Penn Central Railroad the
use of substantial, buildable air space between the legal height limit and the top of the station,
still did not, in regulatory taking parlance go “too far.”333 The substantial impact on the regulated
property site was partially offset by the showing of some economic return on the still – operational
station, tax abatement and the potential of transferable development rights.334 Penn Central could,
in theory, transfer some of the unused building potential to other sites where construction could
330

See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
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438 U.S. at 115-116.
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438 U.S. at 117-119.
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The inherent and resolutely indeterminate line between the legitimate use of the police power
and the nether reaches requiring just compensation for validity was described by Justice Holmes
as the point at which power has gone “too far”. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922). “The general rule . . . is that while property may be regulated to a certain content, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id.
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38 U.S. at 118-119, 137-138.
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then exceed the structures of the zoning envelope without changing the overall density limits of
the zoning area.335
In the case of Huron Cemetery, the constitutional argument for use of the airspace was
considerably stronger. Since the BIA had effectively precluded disturbance of the surface, the use
of the airspace was necessary to allow any reasonable economic use of the trust land and avoid
the declaration of a categorical taking.336
Though Bearskin would later claim that the casino-on-stilts idea was hyperbole and an
attempt to force action on the Woodlands site337, the Kansas Wyandots felt that he meant it. Holly
Zane, tribal attorney and a daughter of former Chief George Zane, said “if the cemetery came
between his casino, he’d take a shovel and dig up the bodies himself.”338
The fight was on. On May 12, 1994, Jan English, the second chief of the Kansas
Wyandots, filed a letter of intent to petition for federal recognition with the Office of
Acknowledgement within the BIA.339 The process of acknowledgement is long, expensive and
uncertain, but, if successful, would place the Kansas Wyandots on an equal footing with the
Oklahoma Wyandottes in future battles over the cemetery.340
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See generally, John J. Costonis, “Development Rights Transfer, An Exploratory Essay”, 83
YALE L. J. 75 (1973); John J. Costonis, “The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the
Preservation of Urban Landmarks”, 85 HARVARD L. REV. 574 (1972).
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See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). “ . . . . when the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
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taking.” 505 U.S. at 1019.
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See Mike Belt, “Wyandots Seek Tribal Status” Kansas City Kansan, (Sunday, April 16, 1995)
1, accessed at http://www.wyandot.org/recogn.htm (11/15/2014) (Hereinafter, Belt). See supra,
note 112.
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Though federal recognition of Indian tribes has historically been accorded by treaty,
statute and court decision,341 the approach since 1994 has involved a multi-fact administrative
procedure outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations.342 Among the most significant of the
mandatory criteria are: a) petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a
substantially continuous basis since 1900; b) a predominant part of the petitioning group
composes a distinct community and has existed as a community from historical terms until the
present; c) the petitioner has maintained a political influence or authority over its members as an
autonomous entity from historical times until the present; and d) the membership consists of
individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe.343
Most of the nearly 400 Kansas Wyandot members live in the Kansas City metropolitan
area and have maintained tribal and corporate relations since the treaty – induced split of 1855.344
Land is perhaps the critical core of sovereignty345 and, although the Kansas Wyandots did not
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See Public Law 103-454, 108 Stat 4791 § 3(3) (Nov. 2, 1994)
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25 C.F.R. Part 83.
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25 C.F.R. § 83.7.
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See Belt, supra note 340, at 1-2. The Kansas Wyandots incorporated under state law as a nonprofit corporation in 1959. Id, at 2.
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See Charles Wilkinson and Eric Biggs, “The Evolution of the Termination Policy” 5 Am. Ind.
L. Rev. 139, 151-154 (1977); Joseph Singer has written that the Federal Government and the
Supreme Court have manipulated the proprietary power and sovereign power unity into separate
categories in order to facilitate their self-interest at the tribes expense.
“In recent years, the Supreme Court has manipulated the public/private distinction
as it applies to tribes in a way that has given tribal governments the worst of both
worlds. When tribes would benefit from being classified as property holders, the
courts often treat them as sovereigns. Thus when Congress abrogates treaties, the
Court often conceptualizes Indian tribes as public sovereigns and assumes that
Congress has plenary power to pass statutes which limit tribal sovereignty by
regulating areas of social life that otherwise would have been left to the tribes.
Under this view treaties are not conceptualized as creating property rights that are
protected by the Fifth Amendment and thus Congress is free to cut back on tribal
sovereignty at will. On the other hand where tribes would benefit from being
classified as sovereigns, the Court often conceptualizes tribes as private
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have true tribal land base, they did have, at Huron Cemetery, an emotional center.346 Jan English,
who became the tribe’s principal chief following the retirement of George Zane and is the driving
force behind the quest for recognition,347 has written about her entrance into the embrace of the
sacred cemetery.
“Our walk toward the peaceful and quiet graves serenaded by the songs of birds
and the soft percussion of creatures rustling through dried leves, was interrupted by
my grandmother’s cry of “Come Back here!” One of the three teen-aged boys
running away from the graves toward the back exit of the cemetery stopped, briefly
talked with my grandmother, dropped his head and loped off to join companions
who laughed at us from a distance. One held a small metal sign attached to a stake,
and taunted us by waving it in our direction.
Grandmother turned and walked toward me. For the first time I saw that she was
crying and that tears ran down her face. When I asked what was wrong, she told
me that the boys had stolen the modest little metal marker that served as a
monument over her baby son’s graves in order to be the first to obtain a list of items
that were required in order to win a game called “Scavenger Hunt.” We walked
back in silence, and I was somewhat uncomfortable as we passed the graves of
Hannah Zane, my third great-grandmother, her children, and grandchildren.
I later learned the stories that connected these women to our sisters whose courage
and determination link them with Indigenous women throughout the world; for
their stories contain the contemporary themes that today resonate among people
who must engage in a struggle to preserve rights of justice and self-identity for
themselves and their families. Within these stories is interwoven the thread of grief
that arises from the tension created when a paradigm of fear, power and control is
pitted against a journey toward interconnectedness and interdependence.
It was on that day I began to internalize the oft told story of the daughters of my
great-great aunt’s Eliza Burton Conley, Sr., the three Conley sisters who referred
associations. Thus, in determining the legitimate extent of tribal sovereignty, the
Court has increasingly assumed that tribes cannot exercise powers over
nonmembers. Under this view, tribes are merely voluntary associations which can
act only in ways that affect their members, rather than sovereigns who can exercise
governmental power over any persons who come within their territorial boundaries,
including nonresidents.” Joseph Singer, “Property and Sovereignty” 86 N.W. U.L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1991)
346

“Bearskin’s Gamble”, supra note 298, at 8.
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Belt, supra note 340 at 1.
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to themselves as Ida, Lyda, and Lena. Our family simply called them, “The Sisters”
or “The Cousins.” Their lives were full of stories of heroism and heartache, respect
and humiliating derision; inspiration for our people, and headaches for those who
would intrude upon the rights of our People and, especially, to disrespect the bones
and resting place of Our Ancestors. “ 348
Sam Brownback, the current governor of Kansas, was newly elected to Congress in 1994.
Characterized by core values of faith and morality, he became an ally of the Kansas Wyandot, in
part because of his respect for the sacred, and also because of his basic opposition to gaming.349
When Leaford Bearskin announced plans to build a casino over the cemetery, in lieu of his
preferred but unfulfilled dream of a casino at the Woodlands, Brownback preempted the ploy with
an amendment to the appropriation legislation for the Department of the Interior.
“the lands of the Huron Cemetery shall be used only –
a) For religious and cultural use that are compatible with use of the lands as a
cemetery; and
b) As a burial ground”350
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See Jan K. English, “Tears of the Grandmothers”, 2 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
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See Jeff Sharlet “Gods Senator”, Rolling Stone (Jan. 25, 2006), accessed at
http://www.yuricareport.com?PoliticalAnalysis/GodsSenatorBrownback.html (4/3/2015).
“Brownback has been a staunch opponent of environmental regulations that Koch
finds annoying, fighting fuel-efficiency standards and the Kyoto Protocol on global
warming. But for the senator, there’s no real divide between the predatory
economic interests of his corporate backers and his own moral passions. He
received more money funneled through Jack Abramoff, the GOP lobbyist under
investigation for bilking Indian tribes of more than $80 million, than all but four
other senators – and he blocked a casino that Abramoff’s clients viewed as a
competitor. But getting Brownback to vote against gambling doesn’t take bribes;
he would have done so regardless of the money.”
Id., at 11.
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Brownback’s Amendment No. 1204 to the Indian Appropriations Bills. HR 2107, was enacted
into law on several occasions , including Public Law 106-291 (2000)
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Brownback stated “It’s beyond decency to do something like that. This is an ancestral
burial ground and it should be left as such.”351 To which Bearskin replied “Apparently the senator
is of the old school that believes that treaties with Indian Tribes were meant to be broken.”352
Bearskin had a point. The only way Brownback’s legislation could square with the
language of the Treaty of 1855 – and with the Constitution – was if the words “the portion now
enclosed and used as a public burying ground shall be permanently reserved and appropriated for
that purpose” were intended by both parties to be words of limitation or prescription.353 Many
treaties contained language of reservation seemingly qualified and limited to particular uses, but
the Court has consistently read the words as words merely of description that did not impair the
tribes’ residual sovereignty, proprietary interests or discretion.354 The Supreme Court has long
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Libby Quaid, “Brownback Legislation Would Bar Tribe From Building Bingo Hall Atop Indian
Cemetery in Kansas City, Kansas” Topeka Capital Journal/Associated Press (Sept. 19, 1997)
accessed at http://cjonline.com/ stories/091997/gambling.html (4/3/2015)
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Treaty with the Wyandot 10 Stat. 1159, Article 2; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,
505 U.S. 1003, (1992) held in part,
“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
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(emphasis added) 505 U.S. at 1027.
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See e.g. Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1932). In describing the Treaty of Hopewell
language of land “allotted” as “hunting grounds”, the Court said the language was descriptive
rather than restrictive.
“So with respect to the words ‘hunting grounds.’ Hunting was at that time the
principal occupation of the Indians, and their land was more used for that purpose
than for any other. It could not, however, be supposed, that any intention existed
of restricting the full use of the lands they reserved. To the United States, it could
be a matter of no concern, whether their whole territory was devoted to hunting
grounds, or whether an occasional village, and an occasional corn field, interrupted,
and gave some variety to the scene.

31 U.S. at 553.
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felt that the tribes, ceding land to another party in control of the language, the drafting and the
negotiating power, should be accorded the benefit of the doubt in cases of ambiguity and
vagueness, and an interpretation in accord with their expectations.355 Thus, clearly since the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Court has viewed even vague descriptions of reservation
as affording a full beneficial interest, constitutionally protected against an uncompensated
taking.356
The language of the Treaty of 1855, though referring to the present use as a burial ground,
did not prohibit other uses or perhaps more significantly, did not purport to retain any beneficial
interest in the United States.357 Yet that, in fact, is what Brownback’s amendment did. The
Wyandotte stilt proposal, though not inconsistent with the cemetery use as a burial ground, was
deemed by Congress to be incompatible with its view of decency and proper spiritual observation.
Those interests, certainly not illegitimate, were, however, not beneficial interests that the United
States had clearly sought to retain.
It would seem that the Oklahoma Wyandotte had the basis for a Tucker Act proceeding in
the Court of Federal Claims for Fifth Amendment compensation,358 or, at least, for additional
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See Charles Wilkinson and John Volkman “Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation: As Long as
Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth” – How Long a Time is That”, 63 CAL. L. REV.
601, 617-619 (1975).
356

U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, 304 U.S. 111, 117118 (1938).
“The treaty, though made with knowledge that there were mineral deposits and
standing timber in the reservation, contains nothing to suggest that the United States
intended to retain for itself any beneficial interest in them. The words of the grant,
coupled with the government’s agreement to exclude strangers, negative the idea
that the United States retained beneficial ownership.”
Id, at 117.
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Id, at 112-116.
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leverage in the quest for gaming at the Woodlands. In fact, the House Resource Committee voted
to pursue the Woodlands compromise because Brownback’s amendment had been unfair and
perhaps illegal.359

B. Acquisition of the Scottish Rite Temple Tract
Leaford Bearskin was proceeding on a number of fronts in Kansas, even though his central
quest was the expansive opportunities at the Woodlands. It may well have been that collateral
endeavors such as the casino on stilts was a diversion designed to bring the Woodlands venture
to fruition. Another brushfire – or so it may have seemed – was the idea of gaming at the Scottish
Rite Temple, adjacent to the Huron Cemetery.
The temple, only three stories in height, represented at best less than 30,000 square feet
of interior space360 – hardly enough for a destination casino. In addition, the temple had been
listed on the National Register since 1985, and, since 1983, was a Kansas Historic Landmark.361
The procedural provision of the National Historic Preservation Acts’ Section 106 and the
substantive protections of the city and state preservation legislation would thus come into play in
359

See Libby Quaid, “Bill Would Pave Way For a Casino”, Associated Press (May 20, 1998).
“The House Resources Committee voted Wednesday to lift a prohibition on an
Oklahoma Indian tribe’s opening a casino at a Kansas racetrack. The committee’s
chairman, Rep. Don Young, R. Alaska, said Congress had unfairly blocked an
earlier casino plan by the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma. Sen. Sam Brownback,
R-Kan., had the prohibition inserted into a spending bill last year. “It passed
without a hearing, without giving the tribe a chance to argue its side of the issue,
without the input of local officials,” Young said.”
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See National Park Service, National Register of Historic Places – Nomination Form/Scottish
Rite Temple/Kansas City, Kansas. The nomination form was prepared by Richard Cawthon of the
Kansas State Historical Society, on June 24, 1985, and was based on a draft submitted by Larry C.
Hancks (accessed at www.kshs.org/..national_register/..Wyandotte../scottish_rite-Temple
(4/5/2015).
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See Larry Hancks, Unified government of Wyandotte County, Scottish Rite Temple, accessed
at www.wycokck.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id (4/5/2015)(hereinafter Larry Hancks)
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the event of a transformative threat.362 It is ironic at the least that, of all Bearskin’s Kansas plans,
this was the one that first became reality.
Bearskin had acquired an option on the temple in 1996, and was proposing to use money
to be received from the United States in settlement of historic treaty underpayments, as both
purchase money and the lever to precipitate automatic trust status.363 Congress had passed a law
in 1984 to appropriate and distribute money awarded to the Wyandottes by the Indian Claims
Commission and the Court of Claims.364 One directive in the 1984 statute stated “ . . . $100,000
of such funds shall be used for the purchase of real property which shall be held in trust by the
Secretary for the benefit of such Tribe.”365
In January of 1996, the Oklahoma Wyandottes requested that the Department of Interior
take the Shriner Tract into trust, and on June 12, 1996, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs
posted a notice expressing BIA consent.366 Reaction was swift.
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A month later, the state of Kansas, the Kickapoo Tribe, the Iowa Tribe, the Prairie Band
Potawatomi, the Sac and Fox and the Kansas Wyandots sought a temporary injunction against
trust acquisition which was granted by the district court on July 12, 1996367 – and lifted three days
later by the Tenth Circuit, which preserved the rights of the parties to seek ultimate resolution of
the issues.368 The same day, July 15, the Secretary took title to the temple tract into trust for the
benefit of the Oklahoma Wyandotte.369

C. The Settlement Contract and the Wendat Confederacy
The Kansas Wyandot, plaintiffs in the suit to enjoin the trust acquisition of the temple,
made a dramatic and unusual turn away from arena of litigious battle and toward the healing of
the chasm that had split the Wyandot for nearly a century and a half. In July of 1998, the
Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma and the Wyandot Nation of Kansas signed a settlement agreement
that largely ended the squabbles over the cemetery and promised alliance, cooperation and support
for the future.
It was not total consensus, it might be noted upfront, because the Oklahoma tribe still
claims, by virtue of Supreme Court precedent, that it holds the full beneficial interest, while the
Kansas Wyandots still feel that their individualized treaty rights passed from signatory ancestors
to their descendants.370 More significantly, however, the parties agreed that
“The use and enjoyment of the Huron Cemetery has been and shall forever be
limited to the preservation, protection, restoration, maintenance and use of the
Huron Cemetery as a cemetery… [and that the parties shall not] authorize or permit
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Id; See also 240 F.3d at 1257 and Miller, supra note 365 at 1.
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See Chapter 4(c) supra.
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any construction, development or business activity on, over, or under the Huron
Cemetery.”371
The Wyandot Nation also agreed that, if it received federal recognition, it would not seek
to obtain a gaming facility in Kansas, an assurance that it gave to all the other Kansas-based
tribes.372 It also promised the Oklahoma tribe that it would drop out of the multi-plaintiffed lawsuit
challenging the trust status of the temple373 – at least if the Department of the Interior approved
the compact. Because the agreement bore on the usage of Indian trust land, it theoretically required
the assent of the trustee.374 Holly Zane, attorney for the Wyandot Nation, felt that though approval
was desirable, it was not necessary to bind the parties375 – which was fortunate since the BIA,
enmeshed in the Cobell376 litigation, never responded.
The agreement did not prohibit – nor encourage – gaming on the temple site, and the
Kansas Wyandots clearly were not happy with any gaming in the vicinity of the cemetery. But, as
Holly Zane said,
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Carras, supra note 371, at 1.
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See supra, note 367.
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See 25 U.S.C. § 177 and 25 U.S.C. § 81.
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Carras, supra note 367, at 2.
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The Cobell litigation, which began in 1996 as Cobell v. Babbitt, spanned four different
Secretaries of the Interior, 13 years of litigation and over 20 legal opinions. It was finally settled
in 2010 by the Claims Resolution Act which provided 3.4 billion dollars for the plaintiffs in the
Cobell v. Salazar class action trust case. See Patrick Reis, “Obamma Administration Strikes §3.4
B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit” New York Times, (Dec. 8, 2009) accessed at
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire
/2009/12/08/08greenwire-obama-admin-strikes-34b-deal-inindian-trust-lawsuit.
73

“Our top priority with the agreement was to prevent gambling on the cemetery site.
We don’t think the temple is the right place either. But we have shut off any
possibility of gambling at the cemetery itself. “377
The agreement proved to be a watershed – not only a binding statement on the mutual
desire to preserve the cemetery but a beginning to the end of discord and a foothold for the
reunification of cultural relations of the former Wendat Confederacy. The Confederacy consists of
the four existing tribes, two in Canada and two in the United States that descended from the original
Wendat/Ouendat Nation which was in effect before European incursion into the Hudson Lake –
Great Lakes region.378 The Nation, scattered and distracted by the external forces, retained a
common spiritual essence within the several parts and this was reunited in a cultural cohesion on
August 27, 1999 in Midland, Ontario.379 The leaders of the respective tribes – Chief Willie Piccard,
Huron Wendat of Wendake, Chief Leaford Bearskin, Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma, Second
Chief Jim Bland, Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma, Chief Janith K. English, Wyandot Nation of

377

Carras, supra note 367, at 3.

378

See “Wendat”. Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia
Britannica
Inc.,
2015.
Web.
05
Apr.
2015
http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/639738/Wendat.
“Wendat, among North American Indians, a confederacy of four Iroquois -speaking bands of the Huron nation—the Rock, Bear, Cord, and Deer bands –
together with a few smaller communities that joined them at different periods for
protection against the Iroquois Confederacy. When first encountered by Europeans
in 1615, the Wendat occupied a territory, sometimes called Huronia, around what
are now Lake Simcoe and Georgian Bay, Ontario, Canada. Some of the Wendat
villages, consisting of large bark-covered dwellings housing several families each,
were palisaded for protection. Villages were situated near fields where the Wendat
grew corn (maize), the staple of their diet, which they supplemented with fish and,
to a lesser extent, game. Weakened by diseases introduced by Europeans and
unable to obtain as many firearms and ammunition as their enemies, the Wendat
were destroyed by the Iroquois Confederacy in 1648-50, and the constituent tribes
dispersed. The neighbouring Tionontati united with some Huron refugees and
became known to the English as the Wyandot, a corrupted form of Wendat. In the
early 21st century, population estimates indicated some 3,500 Wendat
descendants.”
379

See “The Wendat Conderacy” The Wyandot Nation of Kansas website, www.wyandot.org
accessed 11/26/2014.
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Kansas, Spokesperson Steven A. Gronda, Wyandot Nation of Anderdon, -- adopted a foundational
document for the Wendat Confederacy. It states:
“Over ten generations ago, the Wendat people were driven to many directions from
our beloved homeland. Today, 350 years later, we stand with our children and grand
children at our sides and come together once again to affirm the Wendat
Confederacy. With gratitude to the Creator and the reverent thanksgiving of
kinship, we light the council fire and invite all who come in a spirit of peace and
brotherhood to enjoy its warmth. The Wendat tree of brotherhood has sent out four
strong roots to form four nations, each on separate and growing in different
direction, yet each adding strength to the whole. These four roots feed the branches
of our families and clans so that the Wendat people may endure and flourish
through ten more generations. May we sit in the shade and watch the council fire
as we meet together to affirm the bond of the Confederacy. May our hearts be pure
and our minds clean as we act in a manner that will bring honor to the ancestors
and hope to our children.
The Wendat Peacemaker once outlined the path towards unity. Leaders were
admonished to never disagree seriously among themselves, for to do might cause
the loss of rights of their grandchildren. May we always cultivate feelings of
friendship, love, and honor for each other so that the good tiding of Peace and
Power of Righteousness will be our guide.
May our leaders endeavor to serve each nation in a manner that will bring peace,
happiness and prosperity for all the people. May the thickness of our skin be seven
spans – which is to say the span should protect against anger, offensive actions, and
criticism. May our hearts be full of peace and good will and our minds filled with
a yearning for the welfare of the people of the Confederacy. With endless patience,
may we fulfill our duty, and may our firmness be tempered with tenderness and
compassion. May neither anger nor fury find lodging in our minds; and may all our
words and actions be marked by calm deliberation.
Finally, if any nation of the Confederacy should ever need help. [L]et it call out the
others to come to its aid. We vow to attempt to work together in way that embers
of long ago council fires may be fanned into a flame of kinship, culture and love
that will warm countless generations of Wendat people. “380
Historian Lee Sultzman once wrote that,
“[F]actionalism has plagued the Huron and/or Wyandot for the last 400 years. The
bitter fight for recognition between the Citizens and Indian Parties has persisted to
380

Id.
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the present day between the Wyandot Nation of Kansas and the Wyandotte Tribe
of Oklahoma.”381
The modern Wendat Confederacy, reborn in 1999, represents a cultural and spiritual, if not
political, reunion, and an end to fighting over the future of the cemetery, if not a common economic
agenda.

D. Attacks on the Land in Trust
The reestablishment of the Wendat Confederacy and the healing of inter-tribal relationships
did not, however, soften the economic necessities and aspirations of Leaford Bearskin. He may
have foresworn intentions for the cemetery, but he still wanted a Kansas City casino – and he had
title to the Scottish Rite Temple tract. Its status as a base for gaming, however, was under continued
legal attack by the Kansas tribal coalition, and was not warmly embraced by the Kansas Wyandots
who saw it as a profane and discordant contrast to the sacredness of the cemetery.382 Bearskin saw
it as a less desirable than the Woodlands but, if necessary, he could accept it as a not inconsistent
economic polarity to the other wordly repose of the cemetery.383
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Lee Sultzman, “Huron History”, accessed at www.tolatsga.org/hur.html (11/26/2014).
Sultzman also stated that “Americans usually do not realize that Huron and Wyandot are the same
people.” Id, at 3. This may account for the oft-voiced confusion over the name of the “Huron
Indian Cemetery.”
382

See supra, note 377.

383

See ELIADE, supra note 2, at
“It must be added at once that a profane existence is never found in the pure state.
To whatever degree he may have desacralized the world, the man who has made
his voice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely doing away with
religious behavior. It will appear that even the most desacralized existence still
preserves traces of a religious valorization of the world.”

Id. at 23.
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After the Tenth Circuit vacated the 1996 temporary injunction,384 the plaintiffs – now
without the company of the Kansas Wyandots – again challenged the legality of the Department
of the Interior’s trust acquisition of the temple tract. On March 2, 2000 the District Court dismissed
the complaint for failure to join the Wyandottes as a necessary and indispensible party.385 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Wyandotte Tribe was not essential to a
determination386 and then proceeded to deal with the validity of the trust acquisition and the
intended use of gaming.
The Court of Appeals felt that, in spite of the Indian Reorganization Acts’ provision on the
acquisition of land for Indians,387 and notwithstanding the implementing regulations’ emphasis on
agency discretion,388 the Distribution Act of 1984389 had clearly indicated that the Secretary had a
non-discretionary mandate to take into trust property purchased with Indian Claim Commission
awards.390 Thus, the Secretary was obligated to take the temple tract directly into trust, and was
384

See supra notes 367-368.

385

Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Babbitt, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127 (D. Kansas 2000) See
“Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, (1991)
(‘Suits against Indian tribes are . . . barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear
waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation’ . . . Under the circumstances of
this case, we do not believe that, even though the Wyandotte Tribe voluntarily
intervened as a defendant there has been a clear or unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity as to either taking the Shriner Tract into trust or declaring the Huron
Cemetery to be “reservation” land.”

Id, at 1127.
386

Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d. 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001).

387

25 U.S.C. §465.
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25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)
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Pub.L. 98-602; 98 Stat. 3149 See supra, Chapter 6(b).

390

See 240 F. 3d. at 1261-1262
“[Pub.L. 98-602 Section 105 ©(1) states] . . . approval of the Secretary for any
payment or distribution by the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma of any funds
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not obligated or entitled to comply with either the National Historic Preservation Act391 or The
National Environmental Protection Act392 before acting.393 The Court was not, however, able to
conclude from the facts shown that only funds appropriated under the Distribution Act were used
to purchase the temple tract, and thus remanded the case for consideration by the Department of
the Interior.394
The Secretary later confirmed that the allotted funds, together with interest, was more than
enough to cover the purchase price.395 The clogged plaintiffs, however, refused to quit and filed

described in subsection*(b) . . . shall not be required and the Secretary shall have
no further trust responsibility for the investment, supervision, administration, or
expenditure of such funds. “Subsection (c)(1) clearly indicates that the Secretary
shall have no discretion in deciding whether to take into trust a parcel of land
purchased by the Wyandotte Tribe with Pub.L. 98-602 funds. We therefore agree
with the Secretary and the district court that, notwithstanding the provisions of the
IRA, Pub.L. 98-602 imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the Secretary.”
Id at 1261-1262.
391

16 U.S.C. § 470 et. seq.

392

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq.

393

240 F.3d. at 1162.

394

240 F.3d at 1163-1164.

395

See Kevin Washburn, Asst. Sec. Of Indian Affairs, United States Department of Interior, 3-4
(July 3, 2014). Washburn, writing to Chief Billy Friend of the Wyandotte Nation, said:
“At one stage of the Shriner Tract litigation, the Tenth Circuit remanded the
acquisition decision to the district court after concluding the Department’s
administrative record did not support a finding that the Nation used 602 Funds to
acquire the property. The district court then remanded the decision back to the
Department to “reconsider whether [602 Funds] alone were used to purchase the
Shriner Tract. Responding to this directive, the Nation hired the accounting firm
KPMG to prepare an analysis that tracked the amount of interest earned from the
602 Funds during the 10 year period of its investment. The Department’s position,
which was later affirmed in litigation, was that the Nation could invest its 602 Funds
and add the interest it earned from the 602 Funds to the principal $100,000 to
purchase property for acquisition under the Act.

Letter link included in “Indian Gaming: BIA won’t place Wyandotte Nation Casino site (at Park
City) in Trust” Indianz.com (July 7, 2014) accessed at http://www.indianz.com/
IndianGaming/2014/027972.asp (4/9/2015).
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yet another action in district court challenging the Secretary’s determination of the funds and
decision on the trust as arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence. Judge Julie Robinson affirmed
the trust status, finding that there was substantial evidence to support the Secretary,396 and that any
interpretation of ambiguities in the language of the Distribution Act were entitled to Chevron
difference.397
Before reaching the merits of any disputes over monetary evidence or statutory
construction, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals put what seemed to be the final stopper in the
incessant paper wars, relentlessly waged by the State of Kansas and the Horton area Indian
Tribes.398 The Secretary raised, for the first time in the case, a preclusive jurisdictional argument
that sovereign immunity barred the challenge to title in trust for Indians.399 The Court, considering
the claim because claims of sovereign immunity are an exception to the general rule against
considering new arguments on appeal,400 noted that, at the time the complaint was filed, the tract

The Bureau of Indian Affairs previously had published an official notice in the Federal Register
confirming that The Secretary of the Interior has determined that the funds used to purchase the
Shriner’s Property in Kansas City, Kansas were from the section 602 settlement of specific land
claims. The Secretary affirms that trust status of the subject lands. 67 FR 10926-01 (Monday,
March 11, 2002).
396

Governor of the State of Kansas v. Norton, 430 F.Supp. 2d. 1204, 1222-1226 (D. Kan. 1218).

397

430 F.Supp. 2d at 1218-1221, citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-843.

398

Governor of the State of Kansas v. Kempthorne, 516 F.3d. 833 (Tenth Cir. 2008)

399

See 516 F.3d at 840-841:
“Before we may reach the various facets of this question, however, we are faced
with a jurisdictional argument raised by the Secretary for the first time on appeal.
The Secretary now argues that sovereign immunity bars the present suit because, at
the time the instant complaint was filed, the Shriner Tract was already held in trust
by the United States for the Wyandotte, and the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409a,
‘retain[s] the United States’ immunity from suit by third parties challenging the
United States’ titled to land held in trust for Indians.’ Id.”

400

516 F.3d at 841.
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was already held in federal trust.401 The Court, further, agreed with the Secretary that the Quiet
Title Act402 provided no waiver of sovereign immunity for suits by third parties challenging the
United States title in trust for Indian lands.403 The appeal was dismissed and the case remanded to
the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment for lack of jurisdiction.404
The gates of sovereign immunity had swing shut with Leaford Bearskin’s little casino
tucked safely inside as Indian trust property. Perhaps now the litigation could end and the
Oklahoma Wyandotte’s might reap some modest profits for the persevering tribe. Almost
simultaneously with the Tenth Circuit opinion, the tribe opened the doors of the 7th Street Casino
on January 10, 2008.
“After years in court, Chief Bearskin said, the fight is over and the tribe won. ‘We
went by all the rules and regulations set up by Washington,’ said Chief Bearskin.
‘We went by the law and came out on top. We’re going to stay on top.’ ‘The people
of Kansas City will never be sorry the Wyandotte are here.’”405
Well, perhaps a bit more litigation. Even after the opening of the casino, and even after the
city seemed to embrace it and appreciate the boost it provided to the struggling urban economy,
the state of Kansas and the Kansas Tribes, plowed ahead with yet another lawsuit. The plaintiffs
claimed that they had originally sued in 1996 before the temple tract was purchased and taken into
trust,406 and had alleged facts that made the land into trust decision improper as a matter of
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516 F.3d. at 844.
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28 U.S.C. § 4209a; See Miller, supra note 365 at 410.
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516 F.3d at 845-846.
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516 F.3d at 846.
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Lloyd Devine, “7th Street Casino Opens” Tribal News, (Febr. 10, 2008) accessed at
http://www.wyandotte-nation.org/tribal-news/7th-street-casino/ (4/9/2015).
406

See supra Chapter 6(b).
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substantive administrative law.407 The District Court, feeling that the current status of land in trust
was determinative on the issue of sovereign immunity, and not the date of filing, dismissed the
action.408 The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that the Quiet Title Act provides the “exclusive means
[to] challenge the United States’ title to real property”.409 Moreover, said the Court, the QTA may
bar suit even when the plaintiff does not claim an interest in the property, but only the propriety of
acquisition.
“In determining whether a suit must be treated as a quiet title action sufficient to
invoke the QTA, we ‘focus on the relief sought by the plaintiffs. Seeking to remove
land currently held in trust by the United States or to encumber that land constitutes
a challenge to the government’s title sufficient to bring a claim within the ambit of
the QTA, despite the fact that plaintiffs do not themselves seek title to the land.
Consequently, if plaintiffs’ case is to proceed, it must do so exclusively under the
QTA; the APA is no longer relevant given the relief sought.”410
It is noteworthy – and ominous – that, for this holding, the Court relied on the precedent of
Neighbors for Rational Development v. Norton.411 This presents a problem that will be explored
in Chapter 8.

Chapter 7: The Quixotic Quest for the Lowlands
Off to the side of the decades of litigation over the cemetery, the temple and trust status
was a land-claim joy-ride brought by Leaford Bearskin and his merry band of litigators. In truth it
seemed in retrospect more like a ploy-perhaps tongue in cheek – to promote, or provoke, a

407

See Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 4186890, at 1-2.

408

Id at 11.

409

Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska v. Salazar, 607 F.3d. 1225, 1230 (Tenth Cir. 2010). Only
the Iowa Tribe had appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Id.
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607 F. 3d, at 1230-1231.

411

379 F.3d. 956, 961-962 (Tenth Cir. 2004); See 607 F.3d. at 1230-1231.
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settlement on the Woodlands, rather than a sincere effort at reclamation.412 Still, it had some wheels
and raised some nervous eyebrows.
In June of 2001, the Oklahoma Wyandotts sued the Unified Government of Kansas City
and Wyandotte County, Kansas, and numerous private land owners including International Paper,
Owens Corning Fiberglass and General Motors.413 The suit claimed ownership of three sections of
land and riverbed accretions that the plaintiffs’ alleged were not ceded to the United States under
the Treaty of 1855, and had been illegally granted to non-Indians.414 The tribe asserted that under
Article 2 of the treaty, the tribe agreed to cede only the land that “was purchased (emphasis added)
by them of the Delaware Indians”415 and did not agree to give up the three sections of land that
had been gifted.416 Furthermore the Tribe contended that “patents by the United States to land
within the sections, and subsequent transfers by the grantee are all invalid.”417
Larry Hancks, the foremost Wyandot historian in the Kansas City area, states that
“Historically, this was nonsense, although obviously very few people were aware of that.”418
412

Larry Hancks, a historian working for the Unified Government of Wyandotte County, wrote:
“It was speculated by some of the more cynical observers that one possible purpose
of the lawsuit was not to seriously claim that the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma
was the legitimate owner of the properties in question, but rather to state a claim
with just enough apparent validity that it could raise questions about land titled,
making the obtaining of loans and the sale of property more difficult for the present
property owners of record to accomplish”,

“Scottish Rite Temple” at 10 accessed at www.wycokck.org/WorkArea/ DownloadAsset.aspx?id
(11/25/2014) (Hereinafter, LARRY HANCKS).
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Id., at 7.
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Id., at 7.
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See Wyandotte Nation v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas, et
al, 222 FRD 490, 493 (2004).
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222 FRD at 494.
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222 FRD at 494.
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See LARRY HANCKS, supra note 412, at 7; See also THE EMIGRANT TRIBES, supra note 58.
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Hancks notes that the three gifted sections were only referred to as a general, undivided
measurement of land at the time of the transfer from the Delaware, and later under the Treaty of
1855; the three sections were included in the whole and was not separately surveyed until after the
Treaty.419 Thus, there was no way that the plaintiffs could determine which three sections of land
had actually been gifted.
Furthermore, Hancks says, the claim that the United States sold the ceded lands, as it chose,
was wrong. The Wyandots has sought the treaty, citizenship and allotments in severalty and had
been the original holders in severalty of all the ceded lands, including the gifted sections, after the
survey was completed.420
Hancks and others think that the tribe was trying to state a claim with just enough credibility
to escape sanctions for frivolous litigation and put some concern into the minds of title holders and
insurers of some of the most valuable industrial and governmental property in the city.421 Hancks
said, “This in turn could give the tribe a strong bargaining chip in dealing with the State and Federal
governments, possibly leading to an out-of-court settlement giving the tribe both money and a
grant of land in Wyandotte County on which establish a casino, which had always been Chief
Bearskin’s long term goal.”422
The worth of the chips was defused, however, by the federal courts’ interpretive and
procedural approach to dismissal of the claim. In the first sense, the court felt that the treaty
language of cession to both land and sovereignty within “Wyandott country” referred to all of

419

LARRY HANCKS, supra note 412, at 7-8.

420

Id., at 9.

421

See supra, note 412.
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LARRY HANCKS, supra note 412, at 10.
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Wyandotte land, including the gifted sections.423 The court felt that this interpretation was clear,
unambiguous, in accord with the tribal understanding and thus within the interpretive canon that
calls for ambiguities to be construed in the Indians’ favor.424
In a procedural sense, the court found that the Kansas statute of limitations on land claims
had run.425 Under the terms and intent of the 1855 treaty, the tribe had ceded its land to the United
States for survey and reconveyance in severalty to the individuals, and had agreed to the dissolution
and termination of the tribe.426 The use of termination in this sense was even broader than the post
World War II experience in that it contemplated not only ending the nation-to-nation trust
relationship but the tribe itself.427 Of course, attempting to end future internal association is both
impossible and generally unconstitutional.428 In the immediate sense, however, the jurisdiction of
423

222 FRD at 497.
“The court thus finds that the reference to the “Wyandott country” in the 1855
treaty, understood within the meaning of the phrase “Indian country” in 1855, refers
to the territory of the Wyandottes, then existing, within the boundary line of the
tribe, or as to which tribal law applied instead of state or territorial law. Therefore,
all the land of the Wyandotte tribe, including the giften sections, was within the
“Wyandott country” referred to in the 1855 treaty.”

Id.
424

222 FRD at 496-498.
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222 FRD at 499-500.
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222 FRD at 497.
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See supra Ch3, at notes 98-105.

428

See Thomas Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression” 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964).
“Freedom of association has always been a vital feature of American society. In
modern times it has assumed even greater importance. More and more the
individual, in order to realize his own capacities or to stand up to the
institutionalized forces that surround him, has found it imperative to join with
others of like mind in pursuit of common objectives. His freedom to do so is
essential to the democratic way of life. At the same time the exercise of this
freedom has given rise to novel and troublesome problems. Organizations have
grown in size and power, and organizational techniques have achieved a new order
84

the territory of Kansas was extended over the “Wyandott country” in the same manner as over the
other parts of THE territory, and over individual Indian citizens, no longer within a recognized
tribe, as early at 1859.
“The court finds that, given the clear language in Article I of the 1855 treaty making
state and federal law applicable not only to the individual Wyandottes, but also to
the ‘Wyandott country’ as a whole within the Territory of Kansas, that once the
lands were allotted to individual Wyandottes and restraints on alienation removed,
Kansas law applies to subsequent claims regarding the lands at issue in this case…
Applying these principles, Kansas law began to apply to any challenges to the land
patents to the gifted sections no later than their issuance of 1859 to Wyandottes
who were members of the competent class, and no later than 1867 to members of
the incompetent class.”429
Since Kansas law had never provided more than 21 years in which to bring claims for the
recovery of real property, the limitations had long expired and plaintiffs’ complaint was timebarred.430
As an alternative argument the defendants state that the tribe’s claims should be dismissed
for failure and inability to join the United States as a party. 431 The court, swept aside plaintiffs
collateral estoppel arguments from a prior case432 because, at this later point in time, numerous
of effectiveness. These associations have been strenuously resisted at times by
other private groups, or sought to be regulated or curbed by government authority.
At another level the rights of individual members and minority groups within these
centers of private power have come to be a matter of growing concern. And
likewise the position of the individual who does not belong, and who does not wish
to be forced into association, has raised the problems of defining an area of personal
freedom into which neither government nor private organizational power may
intrude.”
Id., at 1.
429

222 FRD at 499, citing Schrimpser v. Stockton, 183 U.S. 290, 296 (1902) and South Carolina
v. Catawba 476, U.S. 498, 507-509 (1986).
430
222 FRD at 499-500.
431

222 FRD at 500.

432

Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City Kansas, 200 F.Supp. 2d 1279, 1294-1299 (D. Kan.
2002).
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additional defendants had been added.433 It then considered whether claims could exist against the
federal government for wrongful issuance of patents from the gifted section and against the holders
of such invalid titles.434 The court found that, under Tenth Circuit law, tribal claims against the
United States, for wrongful taking of land, before August 13, 1946, had to be filed with the Indian
Claims Commission by August 13, 1951.
“Certainly, plaintiff was aware of such claims prior to August 1946, when the ICC
was formed and in August 1951, when the five-year statute of limitations under the
ICCA expired. Plaintiff cannot, in good faith, assert that it was not inconsistent with
its title to the disputed lands prior to 1946, or that no claim against the United States
arose before it decided to bring this lawsuit in 2001. As a result, plaintiff would be
barred from pursing such claims against the United States in this court, or in any
other forum. By sleeping on its claim, the Tribe simply lost its forum to litigate the
pre-1946 actions of the Government that were inconsistent with its alleged title.”435
Having concluded that the Treaty of 1855 gave up all the Wyandotte lands, including the
gifted sections, and that the state and federal statute of limitation had run, the court added another
millstone on the neck of this highly problematic claim. It stated that no suit could be brought
against the individual landowners if the United States, as original grantor and indispensible party
could not be joined.436 Indeed, the courts’ rejection was so complete that the Oklahoma
Wyandottes did not appeal the case, and Larry Hancks reported that disgruntled defendants, forced
to defend a near-frivolous lawsuit, were seeking to recover some of their considerable expenses
from the Tribe.437
433

222 FRD at 500.
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Id., at 502.
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Id., at 502, citing Indian Claims Commission Act § 12, 25 U.S.C. § 70k (1976) and Navajo Tribe
v. State of New Mexico, 809 F.2d. 1455, 1460-1461 (10th Cir. 1987). This seems additionally
appropriate in light of the Wyandotte Tribes use of the Indian Claim Commission to secure finds
for the purchase of the Scottish Rite Temple. See supra Chapter 6(b).
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LARRY HANCKS, supra note 412, at 10.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Supreme Court and the Future
of Trust Lands, Indians and Sacred Sites
A. Trust Lands
There are few things more important to the future of Indian sovereignty than the federal land
trust.438 Though some have denigrated the trust as paternalistic, an anachronism, or a constraint on
self determination,439 in fact, the trust has shielded the land base and the Indians’ sovereignty from
the almost consistently hostile forces of the surrounding states and the local governments.440 From
the inception of the new American nation and the Non-Intercourse Act restraint on alienation of
land without federal consent,441 Indian trust land has been, with the exception of periods of

438

See COHEN’S, supra note 41, at 997-999.
“The terminology of trust law gradually worked its way into the law of tribal
property. Some treaties and statutes referred to tribal ceded land as land to be held
in trust and sold, with the proceeds being deposited in accounts for the tribes. Often
not all of the ceded land was sold, and the trust land remained the property of the
tribe. The first general statute to use the word “trust,” however, appears to be the
General Allotment Act of 1887, which provided that allotted lands were to be held
“in trust.” During the allotment era, federal courts also began to draw on the
language of trust law with respect to tribal property. The Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, which repudiated the allotment policy, similarly indefinitely extended
all “existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands,” and authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to take land “in trust” for Indians and Indian tribes.
Although most tribal property is trust land, not all tribal property is held in trust.
The term “trust land” is often used imprecisely in the case law, however, and it is
important to distinguish between the use of the term for jurisdictional purposes and
for describing tribal interests in property. As a description of property interests,
“trust land” refers to land held in trust by the United States for the benefit of a tribe
or individual Indian. The land may be located within or outside the boundaries of
a reservation.”

Id, at 998.
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See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 37, at 201, 440.
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WILKINSON AND BIGGS, supra note 345, at 152-154, quoted in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 37, at 205-207.
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25 U.S.C. §177; See COHEN’S supra note 41, at 997-999.
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termination for certain tribes, shielded from theft, trespass, fraud and state procedural provisions
like tax foreclosure, adverse possession and statutes of limitations that operate remorselessly
against the often unwary and usually impecunious tribes.442 In addition, the Non-Intercourse Act
is coupled, under the trust doctrine and the federal common law, with an overarching federal
presence that his both plenary power under the constitution443 and the ownership of a legal property
title in trust.444 The result is the power of preemption over unauthorized state intrusion,445 as well
as the duty of oversight and protection.446 The tribe enjoys a presumptive immunity from state and
local regulation and taxation,447 and an economic initiative that, though not total, is still basic to a
functioning self-determination and to the prospect of long-term sustainability.448 The tribe’s land
442

See supra Chapter 7; See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234-240
(1985).

443

Id.

444

Supra note 438.

445

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561-563 (1832). The partial limitation of the Worcester
holding was recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-362 (2001).
“Our cases make clear that the Indians’ right to make their own laws and be
governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation.
State sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border. Though tribes are often
referred to as “sovereign” entitles, it was “long ago” that “the Court departed from
Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within
reservation boundaries . . . That is not to say that States may exert the same degree
of regulatory authority within a reservation as they do without. To the contrary, the
principle that Indians have the right to make their own laws and be governed by
them requires “an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.”

Id
446

United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474-475 (2003).

447

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141-145 (1980).

448

See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014)
“A Key goal of the Federal Government is to render. Tribes more self-sufficient,
and better positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying on
federal funding. 25 U.S.C. §2702(1)(explaining that Congress’ purpose in enacting
88

interest is, generally, one of full beneficial ownership rather than dictated federal management,
and the United States interest is essentially one of naked legal ownership and trust responsibility.
This is, however, enough to create the shield.449
The tribes know very well the essential nature of the trust. Though the terminationists might
tout the ending of the trust as the prelude to freedom and equality, the Indians are clearly aware
that it would really be the obituary to measured separation and meaningful self-determination.450

IGRA was “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes
as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments”,
134 S. Ct, at 2043 (Sotomayor, concurring)
449

See U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
“Although the United States retained the fee, and the tribe’s right of occupancy was
incapable of alienation or of being held otherwise than in common, that right is as
sacred and as securely safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title . . . the authority
of the United States . . . tracts nothing from the tribe’s ownership but was reserved
for the more convenient discharge of the duties of the United States as guardian and
sovereign.

Id at 117-118.
As discussed above, supra Chapter 6(a) this general holding seems fundamentally inconsistent
with the Brownback Bill limitation on the use of the Huron Cemetery.
450

See Charles Wilkinson, “Shall the Islands be Preserved?” in THE EAGLE BIRD, (Hereinafter,
The Eagle Bird)(1999).
“The reservation system is essential to the preservation of Indian culture.
Termination of the reservation system has been tried in many forms, but it has never
worked. The cultures of Jews, Italians, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and others have
all survived in the cities. Indians in the cities have sometimes made it as individuals
but not as a culture. The pace is too frenzied, the contacts too superficial, and the
space too tight. Indian culture has not survived in the cities because Indians are
separatists. They are bound to their land and the sustenance, open space, and
protection it provides. Indians are island people. We should continue to preserve
the islands. Such a course is inconvenient and even mildly expensive. But the
alternatives are worse. Termination of the reservation system would terminate
something inside Indian people. It would terminate values and ideals that should
be available to the rest of society. Termination would also lessen the stature of the
majority society by stripping away a badge of honor: the United States of America
made real promises to real people at real bargaining sessions that the islands would
89

Since 1934, tribal land has been held in trust under the general operation of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) which stopped the hemorrhaging of allotment and extended all trusts
previously established by statute and treaty indefinitely into the future. 451 The forward-looking
thrust of the IRA, necessary for the future of tribalism, for newly recognized tribes, and for the
reconstitution of the decimated tribal land bases, was implemented by 25 USC Section 465, the
land-in-trust provision that authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands for the
tautologically-stated purpose of “providing lands for Indians” The section also provides that title
to the land “shall be taken into trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is
acquired, and such land shall be exempt from state and local taxation.”452
The distinction between trusts for tribes or individuals has been blurred and the operation
of Section 465 obstructed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Carcieri v. Salzar,453 which has
clear implication for the future plans for the Oklahoma Wyandotte – and may portend problems
for even the security of the Huron Cemetery and the future options of a recognized Kansas
Wyandot tribe.
In Carcieri, the Court examined the language of 25 USC Section 479, which defines the
word “Indian” and at least partially qualifies the delegated power to take land into trust for Indian
Tribes and individuals. Section 479 states,
“The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members
of any recognized Indian tribe now (emphasis added) under Federal jurisdiction, and all person
be preserved. If we ever close out the differentness on the islands, we will have
closed out something in Indians and in ourselves.
Id, 41.
451

25 U.S.C. §§ 461-464.

452

25 U.S.C. § 465.

453

129 S.Ct. 1058 (2009)
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who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or
more Indian blood”. 454 Though research has demonstrated that the “recognized Indian Tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction”, addition was indeterminant in meaning and purpose,455 Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, felt that the clause was clear and unambiguous. The ameliorating
approach of the Department of the Interior, which viewed “now” as meaning at the time of the
taking into trust,456 was thus not entitled to Chevron deference, despite 80 years of consistent

454

25 U.S.C. § 479.

455

See Hilary Thompkins, “The Meaning of Under Federal Jurisdiction for Purposes of the Indian
Reorganization Act” United States Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor,
Memorandum M-37029, 8-21)(Hereinafter, Thompkins Memo)(March12, 2014).
“Thus, having closely considered the text of the IRA, its remedial purposes,
legislative history, and the Department’s early practices, as well as the Indian
canons of construction, I construe the phrase “under federal jurisdiction” as
entailing a two-part inquiry. The first question is to examine whether there is a
sufficient showing in the tribe’s history, at or before 1934, that it was under federal
jurisdiction, i.e., whether the United States had, in 1934 or at some point in the
tribe’s history prior to 1934, taken an action or series of actions - through a course
of dealings or other relevant acts for or on behalf of the tribe or in some instance
tribal members – that are sufficient to establish, or that generally reflect federal
obligations, duties, responsibility for or authority over the tribe by the Federal
Government. Some federal actions may in and of themselves demonstrate that a
tribe was, at some identifiable point or period in its history, under federal
jurisdiction. In other cases, a variety of actions when viewed in concert may
demonstrate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction.

Id at 19.
456

See 129 S. Ct. at 1061. The Court and the parties agreed that the only two interpretive options
were 1934 or 1998.
“The parties are in agreement, as are we, that the Secretary’s authority to take the
parcel in question into trust depends on whether the Narragansetts are members of
a “recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. That question,
in turn, requires us to decide whether the word “now under Federal jurisdiction”
refers to 1998, when the Secretary accepted the 31-acre parcel into trust, or 1934,
when Congress enacted the IRA.” 129 S.Ct. 1064.

Since the Narragansett Tribe was not formally recognized until 1983 (129 S.Ct at 1062), the
plaintiffs apparently put all their marbles into the contention that “recognized Indian Tribe now
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practice.457 The Court instead felt that “now” included only members of tribes federally recognized
as of June 1934, when the IRA was passed, and did not include tribes which might be recognized
thereafter. Thus, the Court held that there was no authority under Section 465 to take land into
trust for Indians in tribes that gained federal recognition after that date or were unable to show
federal jurisdiction before that time.458
This was judicial monkey wrenching at its most extreme.459 Literally hundreds of tribes in
the United States have received recognition since 1934, and hold or have applied for land in trust
under Section 465. This would include the Oklahoma Wyandotte who were first clearly recognized
in 1937 under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, terminated in 1956, and then recognized again

under Federal jurisdiction applied to 1998, and did not argue that, though unrecognized in 1934,
they were still under federal jurisdiction.
“We hold that the term “now under Federal jurisdiction” in § 479 unambiguously
refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States
when the IRA was enacted in 1934. None of the parties or amici, including the
Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction
in 1934. And the evidence in the record is to the contrary. 48 Fed.Reg. 6177.
Moreover, the petition for writ of certiorari filed in this case specifically represented
that “[i]n 1934, the Narragansett Indian Tribe . . . was neither federally recognized
nor under the jurisdiction of the federal government.” 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
Thus, the court and the parties ignored the possible argument that the tribe though
unrecognized in 1934, was still under federal jurisdiction and an appropriate recipient of trust land
under 25 U.S.C. § 465. See supra, note 455. See also Breyer, concurring, at 129 S.Ct. 1069-1070
and Souter and Ginsberg, concurring and dissenting in part at 1071.
457

Chevion USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 US 837, 843 (1984) which
authorizes deference by a court to agency construction of ambiguous language, was not applied by
the majority, which felt the language of 25 U.S.C. § 479 was clear and unambiguous. See 129
S.Ct. at 1063, 1065-1068.
458

See supra note 456.

459

The term is derived from Edward Abbey’s iconic novel THE MONKEY WRENCH GANG, (1975),
and suggests disingenuous sabotage to force either paralysis or legislative reform.
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in 1978. Assuming that the latest recognition, after a termination, is the most significant, the
Oklahoma Wyandotte trust lands might seem vulnerable.460
The status of such lands and the scope of modern tribal land protection was thrown into
further doubt by the Court’s

follow-up decision in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak.461 Patchak lived in Michigan, in the immediate vicinity of land
taken into trust for the Pottawatomi Tribe by the Secretary in 2009. He sued, challenging the
Secretary’s authority in light of the Carcieri decision and was met with the argument that he lacked
standing as, under the Quiet Title Act,462 there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for claims

460

Though the Court is Salazar seems to leave room for an application of 25 U.S.C. § 465 based
on federal jurisdiction alone in 1934, (see supra footnotes 455, 456) many commentators seem to
feel that the case, implicity if not explicity, calls for a showing of recognition in 1934 and not just
jurisdiction. This may be a misreading of the case or a forboding of its possible interpretations.
See e.g. Noah Gillespie, “Preserving Trust: Overruling Carcieri and Patchak while Respecting the
Takings Clause” 81 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1707 (2013)
“Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, found that the word “now” was
unambiguous and rejected the need for the First Circuit’s application of Chevron
deference. The Court reasoned that the word “now” in the definition of “Indian” in
§ 479 included only members of tribes that were federally recognized as of June
1934, in part because the presence of the phrase “now or hereafter” elsewhere in
the statute suggested Congress intended something different when it used only
“now” in § 479. Because § 465 of the Act gave the Secretary authority to bring
land into trust only “for the purpose of providing land for Indians,” the Secretary
can do so only for this limited set of tribes. The Secretary therefore had no authority
to take land into trust for the Narragansetts because that tribe did not gain federal
recognition until 1983. The impact of Carcieri could well be far-reaching,
especially because of the many benefits tied to the IRA definition of “Indian.” Of
the 104 tribes federally recognized since 1934 in the continental United States, as
many as 88 may have been grated trust land that, under Carcieri, the Secretary
lacked the authority to give. Perhaps even more striking, the decision calls into
question the status of more than 200 now-recognized tribes that were admitted in
1959—and therefore after 1934—by virtue of Alaska becoming a state.
Id, at 176.
461

132 S.Ct. 2199 (2012)

462

28 U.S.C. § 2409a.
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against lands in trust for Indians.463 The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Patchak did
have prudential standing and that the Quiet Title Act did not bar actions contesting agency
authority under the APA, in contrast to precluding actions to asserting a competing claim of
ownership.464
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. It felt that there was a general waiver
of sovereign immunity in the APA for suits seeking non-monetary agency conduct,465 and that
Patchak’s action sought no title, but only injunctive relief against a trust decision allegedly in
violation of federal law.466 It is noteworthy – and of concern to the Oklahoma Wyandottes – that
Patchak’s action was based on an allegation that the Secretary was not authorized to take land into
trust for a tribe that was not recognized in 1934, but was later recognized in 1999.467 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court overturned one of the cases foundational to the Secretary’s arguments that the
Quiet Title Act failed to displace sovereign immunity for suits against Indian lands in trust – a case
that had been crucial to the result of the Kansas v. Kempthorne case468 which held that the Quiet
Title Act’s exception for sovereign immunity waivers in the case of Indian trust land prevented
the application of the APA and its general waiver of immunity.469 Is the trust status of the Scottish

463

Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F.Supp. 2d 72, 76 (D.D.C. 2009)

464

632 F.3d. 702, 707-711 (D.C.Cir. 2011).

465

5 U.S.C. § 702 waives Federal sovereign immunity from an action “seeking relief other than
money damages, and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or an employee thereof acted or
failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” Quoted at 132 S.Ct. at 2204.
466

132 S.Ct. at 2208-2211

467

132 S.Ct. at 2204

468

516 F.3d. 833 (Tenth Cir. 2008) See supra, notes 398-404.

469

See 516 F.3d at 841, n.4 The case overturned was Neighbors for Rational Development v.
Norton, 379 F.3d. 956, 961-962 (Tenth Cir. 2004). It was noted by the Supreme Court as one of
three circuit decisions that clashed with the DC Circuit, supra note 464, and held that the United
States had immunity from suits like Patchak’s, 132 S.Ct. at 2204.
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Rite Temple tract – now the operating 7th Street Casino – going to be retigated? This may depend
in part on the future of Carcieri and its interpretations.
It has been pointed out that there are potential avenues – or alleyways – around the Carcieri
roadblock.470 These may be necessary for the Oklahoma Wyandottes who were recognized in 1936
and again in 1978, and for any future recognition of the Kansas Wyandots.
For one thing, the word “now” in the infamous phraseology of Section 465 does not modify
“recognized,” it modifies “under federal jurisdiction”471; the Supreme Court graciously accepted
the Narragansetts tactical pleading error that the tribe was, in 1934 “neither federally recognized
nor under the jurisdiction of the federal government.”472 The proof of the former could thus be
deemed, unreasonably, proof of the latter.473 One could easily postulate authority under Section
465 to take land into trust for tribes that are recognized at the time of trust, and were under federal
jurisdiction in 1934.474 It would seem clear that “federal jurisdiction” is broader than “recognition”,
a concept that was still in evolution in the 1970s.475 It was not until 1978 that the Department of
470

See supra notes 455, 456.

471

See Tompkins memo, supra note 455, at 24.

Id.

“The Carcieri majority held, rather, that the Secretary was without authority under
the IRA to acquire land in trust for the Narragansett Tribe because it was not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, not because the tribe was not federally recognized at
that time. The Court’s focused discussion on the meaning of “now” never identified
a temporal requirement for federal recognition. As Justice Breyer explained in his
concurrence, the word “now” modifies “under federal jurisdiction,” but does not
modify “recognized.” As such, he aptly concluded that the IRA “imposes no time
limit on recognition.” He reasoned that “a tribe may have been ‘under federal
jurisdiction’ in 1934 even though the Federal Government did not” realize it “at the
time.”

472

129 S.Ct at 1068. See supra at note 456.

473

See supra at note 460.

474

See Bryer (con) 129 S.Ct., at 1069.

475

Tompkins Memo, supra note 455, at 24; See also Quinn supra note 315.
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the Interiors first promulgated regulations for the demonstration of tribal status sufficient for
recognition.476 The concept of jurisdiction, however, began with the Non Intercourse Act of
1790477 and expanded to a scope of plenary power by the end of the Nineteenth century.478 Cohen’s
Treatise states that
“The authority of Congress extends to all Indian communities in the United States,
including terminated and non-federally recognized tribes. The relationship need not
be continuous. The relevant question is whether and to what extent Congress has
chosen to exercise its authority with respect to a particular tribe. Congress has
exercised its authority to restore the federal-tribal relationship with a number of
terminated tribes.”479
In addition, the non-alienation provisions of the Non Intercourse Act have applied to the
land of any Indians who are identifiable as a tribe, even if the tribe is not formally recognized by
treaty, statute or administrative action.480 In sum, these concepts of jurisdiction are clearly broad
enough to allow Congress to assert authority, and protection over unrecognized tribes and to
acquire land for them after 1934, when recognition is formally accorded.
However, the possibility of establishing eligibility for Section 465 trust acquisition soldly
on the basis of federal jurisdiction in 1934, does not assuage the increased complexity and
uncertainty. It was noted by the United Southern and Eastern Tribes, Inc., that,
“Carcieri has significantly slowed DOI’s processing of trust land applications –
even for those Tribes who may not have a “Carcieri problem.” The uncertainty and
delay that accompanies the “under federal jurisdiction” analysis, which is
determined on a Tribe-by-Tribe basis, can jeopardize potential economic
development opportunities as well as core governmental functions including but
476

25 CFR Part 83 (1978).

477

25 U.S.C. § 177

478

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-568 (1903); See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 200 (2004).
479

See COHEN’S, supra note 41, at 167.

480

Joint Council of the Pasamaquocly Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376-377 (1st Cir. 1975);
See COHEN’S, supra note 41, at 1033.
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not limited to health care provision, housing, and education for all Tribes. Until
Congress restores the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for all Tribes,
Tribal opponents can use Carcieri to bring litigation challenges on proposed
acquisitions and even some lands that are already in trust. Even for those Tribes
that believe they were “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the prospect of costly,
drawn out litigation may frighten away potential partners and investors for
economic development projects. The negative consequences of the Carcieri
decision impact ALL of Indian Country.481
The Indian world, including the Wyandottes of Oklahoma and the Wyandots of Kansas
await the passage of a bill, perhaps that of Senator Jon Tester of Montana, S. 732, which would
amend the Indian Reorganization Act and allow the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust
for, simply and appropriately, all recognized tribes.482

B. Indians
When tribes assert a legal claim to measured sovereignty, federal services and immunity
from state and local regulatory jurisdiction, they often face the backlash argument that the
insulation of Indian interest from laws, taxation and competition is a form of odious redistribution,
special privilege or reverse racism.
“The modern anti-Indian movement was created out of a white ‘backlash’ against
gains made by the modern Indian movement since the 1960’s. At least five major
factors motivate anti-Indian groups. The first is the call for ‘equal rights for whites’
– that the increased legal powers of the tribes infringes on the liberties of the
individual white American taxpayer… The second factor is access to natural
resources. These resources can be fish or game, land or water, but the case is the
same: no citizens should have ‘special rights’ to use the resources… The third factor
is the issue of economic dependency and sovereignty. In a rural reflection of the
‘Welfare Cadillac’ myths used against urban African Americans, all reservations
Indians are said to wallow in welfare, food stamps, free housing and medical care,
affirmative action programs, and gargantuan federal cash payments – all tax-free,
481

See “Should I Care About the Carcieri Fix?”
accessed at www.usetinc.org/. .
./Should%201%20Care%20About%20the%20Carcieri (4/12/2015).
482

See Matt Sharp, “Senate Bill Would Restore DOI Power Over Tribal Lands” accessed at
http://www.law360.com/articles/631284/senate-bill-would-restore-doi-power-over-tribal-lands
(4/12/2015).
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of course… The fourth factor is the attitude of cultural superiority . . .and The fifth
factor is simple racism.”483
Under this argument, government should focus on individual freedom, private property
rights, and common law protections, and deemphasize special subsidies, redistributions and central
regulation of economy, environment and society.484
Implicit in this free market decentralized paradigm is the classless, raceless society of equal
opportunity, and, by necessity. The incompatibility of the special, protected Indian status that has
been observed since before the nation founding.485 The lynchpin for the unique, separate status of
483

Zoltan Grossman, “Treaty Rights and Responding to Anti-Indian Activity”, The Fourth world
Documentation
Project
at
the
Center
for
World
Indigenous
Studies.
http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/fwdp.html accessed at http://www.dickshovel.com /anti.html
(4/16/2015).
484

See, in general, Sam Brownback, “Road Map for Kansas, 2.0” (Hereinafter, Sam Brownback
Roadmap) http://brownback.com/roadmap-kansas/ accessed (12/14/2014); see also Chris
Edwards, “What Do American Indians Deserve: Name Changes or Policy Changes?” (April 13,
2014), posted in Cato Institute:
Downsizing the Federal Government, at
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/print/what-do-american-indians-deserve-name-change
(4/16/2015).
“Historically, one reason why the federal government variously exploited, coddled,
and micromanaged Indians was the belief that they were primitive socialists with
no understanding of market institutions. But research has found that stereotype to
be false. Many indigenous peoples had systems of property rights and private
ownership, and many tribes were entrepreneurial and had extensive trading
networks. Reforms to property rights and the rule of law on reservations would
make Indian lands much more fertile for investment.”
Id.
485

See DONALD FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION, 93 (1986)
“Arthur V. Watkins, a sixty-six year old Republican senator from Utah, had lived
most of his life in that state as a farmer, a lawyer, a devout member of the Mormon
Church, and a local political figure. After winning a seat in the Senate in 1946,
Watkins established a reputation as an old guard conservative of the Republican
Party. Watkins believed that everyone should achieve their goals without
government assistance, regardless of circumstances. From his struggle-to-success
viewpoint, he failed to understand the controlling influences of cultural values and
background, which persisted in guiding the course of Indian lives as Native
Americans attempted to adapt to a white American life-style. His paternal approach
in negotiating with the Menominees and other native groups exemplified
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Indian tribes is the case of Morton v. Mancari,486 which has, thus, become the target for free market
proponents who desire at least the illusion of a level playing field.487
Morton, dealt with a provision of the IRA which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
afford a hiring preference to “qualified Indians”,488 which, under BIA regulations, required one
fourth or more Indian blood and membership in a Federally recognized Tribe.489 The provision
was challenged by non-Indian plaintiffs as “invidious racial discrimination”490, and the issue in
part, was the level of review. A strict judicial scrutiny presumes burdened racial classification
invalid unless the government can demonstrate a compelling interest and narrowly tailored

Id.
486

Republican thinking in congress during the early Eisenhower years: Indians needed
firm supervision in preparing for termination and financial independence. The
senator’s Mormon tradition of industry and hard work, combined with Republican
ideas about free-enterprise, convinced him that Indians had it too easy. Whatever
his specific reasons, the impetuous Watkins sought to eliminate federal services to
Indians in order to put them on a competitive basis with other Americans.”

417 U.S. 535 (1974)

487

See Carol Goldberg “American Indians and Preferential Treatment” 49 UCLA L.REV. 943
(2002)(hereinafter, GOLDBERG)
“Preferences and benefits for American Indians predate the American policy of
affirmative action and flow from different rationales. Nonetheless, Indian
preferences are the latest targets in the battle against affirmative action. Opponents
of Indian preferences and benefits have long deployed the rhetoric of equal rights
to attack treaty rights and other manifestations of the special legal status that Indians
enjoy under federal law. Today, however, anti-tribal groups have joined forces
with anti-affirmative action forces to produce the most intensive challenge yet to
Indian rights.”

Id, at 943.
488

25 U.S.C. § 272.

489

See 44 BIAM 335, 3.1 cited at 417 U.S. 535 n. 24. Since this time the regulation has been
changed to reach members of “any recognized tribe now under federal jurisdiction” who are of
“Indian descent” and “All others of one-half or more Indian blood of tribes indigenous to the
United States” 25 C.F.R. § 5.1.
490

417 U.S. at 551.
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means,491 while non-racial classes might be judged by either a rational basis review – a legitimate
objective and debatably reasonable means492 – or by an intermediate scrutiny approach assuring
substantially reasonable means to an important end.493
In Morton, the Court chose to use a less demanding scrutiny, one that would sustain the
use of classifications keyed to “Indians” or “Indian blood” if the classification was “tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians”494 – an objective that had
been described as important and perhaps compelling but achievable with means accorded
substantial flexibility.495
The court indicated a variety of reasons for the more lenient test, including Congressional
plenary power under the Indian commerce clause, a provision that literally singles out Indians as
a proper subject for legislature classification.496 The Court also pointed to the long history of the
“Indian” classification in treaties, statutes, cases and administrative regulations such as those of
the BIA.497 Finally, the Court asserted, somewhat reticently, in a footnote, that the classification
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) “ . . . all racial classifications
imposed by whatever federal, state or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Id. at 227
492

U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152-154 (1938).

493

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)

494

417 U.S. at 555.

495

417 U.S. at 552-554.
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417 U.S. at 551-552. The court noted “Article II, s 2, cl.2, gives the President the power, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.” Id, at 552; See Robert Clinton,
“Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and SelfGovernment” 33 STANFORD L. REV. 979, 1011-1012 (1981).
497

417 U.S. at 552.
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in the hiring preference was “political rather than racial in nature” as “it applies only to members
of ‘federal recognized tribes”498
Morton has held an uneasy position in the surrounding sea of unviable suspect
classifications. Cases such as Cayetano v. Rice499 nibbled hard at its flanks. In Rice the Court
invalidated a Hawaiian statute that limited the franchise in voting for trustees to the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs to those of native Hawaiian ancestry.500 The majority held that “Ancestry can be
a proxy for race”501 and that Morton v. Mancari dealt with a preference,
“granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasisovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a
unique fashion…The opinion was careful to note, however, that the case was
confined to the authority of the BIA, and agency described as ‘sue generis.’”502
498

Id at 553-554, n. 24 “The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to
exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference
is political rather than racial in natures.”
Id.
499
528 U.S. 495 (2000)
500

528 U.S. at 509-510
“OHA is overseen by a nine-member board of trustees, the members of which “shall
be Hawaiians” and – presenting the precise issue in this case – shall be “elected by
qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by law.” Haw. Const., Art. XII §
5; see Haw.Rev.Stat.§§ 13D-1, 13D-3(b)(1) (1993). The term “Hawaiian” is
defined by statute: ‘Hawaiian’ means any descendant of the aboriginal peoples
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in
Hawaii § 10-2. The statute defines “native Hawaiian” as follows: ‘Native
Hawaiian’ means any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that the term identically
refers to the descendants of such blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which
exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which
peoples thereafter continued to reside in Hawaii’

Id, 509-510.
501

528 U.S. at 514.

502

28 U.S. at 520. The Court also stated that “Hawaii would extend the limited exception of
Mancari to a new and larger dimension.” Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
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Marcia Zug wrote, immediately before the Supreme Court came down with its 2013 Indian
Child Welfare Act case, called Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 503that
“There is no question that ICWA treats Indian children differently than non-Indian
children. Nevertheless, under well-settled law, this distinction is not
constitutionally problematic. In Morton v. Mancari, the Court explained that
‘Indian’ is a political affiliation rather than a racial category. It is uncertain whether
the Roberts Court would agree with this distinction. The Roberts Court has
indicated its strong disapproval of racial preferences, stating ‘The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.’
The Court could reach a similar conclusion regarding ICWA in Baby Girl. But if
the Court were to do so, this holding would not only destroy ICWA but it would
almost completely eliminate existing Indian law.”504
The Supreme Court, however, did not touch Morton v. Mancari, though Justice Thomas
did, in concurrence, lobby for a restrictive view of Articles one’s Indian Commerce Clause and
limits on the federal power to override state law.505 Thus, Morton v. Mancari carries Indian law
and the Indian Trust responsibilities forward into the future, despite the narrowing in Cayetano
with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment and the Hawaiian situation and despite some overt

503

133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).

504

Marcia Zug “Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two and a Half Ways to Destroy Indian Law”
111 Mich L. Rev First Impressions, 46, 49-50 (April, 2013). The quote from Justice Roberts come
from Parents Involved in Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007), quoted
at 111 Mich. L.Rev. First Impressions at 49, 17.19.

505

See 133 S.Ct. at 2568.
“Congress is given the power to regulate Commerce “with the Indian tribes.” The
Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate commerce with all Indian
persons any more than the Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to
regulate commerced with all foreign nationals traveling within the United States.
A straightforward reading of the text, thus, confirms that Congress may only
regulate commercial interactions –“commerce” – taking place with established
Indian communities –“tribes.” That power is far from “plenary.”

Id.
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discontent in the lower court cases.506 One of the most recent opinions from the Ninth Circuit
stated, in affirmance of Mancari,
“We recognize that Mancari addressed a political classification providing a general
Indian hiring preference rater than a tribe-specific preference. But Mancari’s logic
applies with the equal force where a classification addresses differential treatment
between or among particular tribes or groups of Indians. Indeed, based on Mancari,
the Court has specifically upheld differential treatment among Indians.”507
Though the United States Supreme Court has not been particularly supportive of American
Indian sovereignty in the modern era, there are still at some examples of continuing (though
divided) support for sovereignty and treaty rights.508 In addition, Kansas tribes, including the
Oklahoma Wyandotte and the Kansas Wyandots might derive some solace from the attitude of
Governor Sam Brownback. Though Brownback is clearly a free market adherent and a firm
believer in limited government regulation, taxation and spending,509 he is still a resolute supporter
of Indian rights and treaties. With regard to his anti-federalism, he stated “We will continue our
fight against the intrusive reach of the federal government [including] energy regulations …

506

See e.g. KG Urban Enterprises LLC v. Patrick 839 F.Supp 2d 388 (D. Mass. 2012)
“By characterizing tribal distinctions as solely political, the Supreme Court has
avoided grappling with complex cconstitutional issues such as the scope of
congressional power to regulate Indian affairs and the inherent tension between the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. If this Court were
addressing the issue as one of first impression, it would treat Indian tribal status as
a quasi-political, quasi-racial classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny
depending on the authority making it and the interests at stake.”

839 F.Supp. 2d at 404
507

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Company, 753 F. 3d.
977, 987 (2014)(citing Delaware Tribal business Committee v. Weeks 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
508

See e.g. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014)(Upholding the
application of tribal sovereign immunity in commercial gambling operations on non-Indian land)
and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999)(upholding Indian
treaty rights to hunt and fish on ceded lands after statehood).
509

See SAM BROWNBACK, ROADMAP, supra, note 484.
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Obamacare … the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service… and the EPA.”510 However, with regard to
relations with the Indian tribes, he said, in 2007 as a senator:
“For centuries, relations between the United States and the Native peoples
of this land have been in disrepair. For too much of our history, Federal-Tribal
relations have been marred by broken treaties, mistreatment and dishonorable
dealings. I believe it is time we worked to restore these relationships to good health.
Certainly, we cannot erase the record of our past; however, we can
acknowledge our past failures, express sincere regrets, and work toward
establishing a brighter future for all Americans. To achieve these goals, I have
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 4 to extend a formal apology from the United
States to tribal governments and Native people nationwide.”511
The apology passed in 2009 as a part of the Defense Appropriation Act of 2009.512
510

Id., at 2

511

See Sam Brownback “RE: Native American Apology Resolution” (S.J. res. 4)(March 16, 2007)
accessed at www.USCOB.org/brownback (4/17/2015).

512

Pub.L. 111-118 Section 8113; Brownback said,
“What this amendment achieves is recognition, honor, and the importance of Native
Americans t this land and to the United States in the past and today and offers an
official apology for the poor and painful path the U.S. Government sometimes
made in relation to our Native brothers and sisters by disregarding our solemn word
to Native peoples. It recognizes the negative impact of numerous destructive
Federal acts and policies on Native Americans and their culture, and it begins –
begins – the effort of reconciliation.”

Accessed at http://firstpeoples.org/wp/tag/the-apology-to-the-native-peoples-of-the-united-states/
(4/17/2015). See also Robert Longley “Did you know the U.S. apologized to Native Americans?”
About.Com
“In 1993, the U.S. congress devoted an entire resolution to apologizing to Native
Hawaiians for overthrowing their kingdom in 1893. But a U.S. apology to Native
Americans took until 2009 and came stealthily tucked away in an unrelated
spending bill. If you just happened to be reading the 67-page Defense
Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3326), tucked away on page 45, in between
sections detailing how much of your money the U.S. military would spend on what,
you might notice Section 8113: “Apology to Native Peoples of the United States.”
‘The United States, acting through Congress,’ states Sec. 8113, ‘apologizes on
behalf of the people of the United States to all Native Peoples for the many
instances of violence, maltreatment, and neglect inflicted on Native Peoples by
citizens of the United States;” and ‘expresses its regret for the ramifications of
former wrongs and its commitment to build on the positive relationships of the past
and present to move toward a brighter future where all the people of this land live
104

C. The Protections of the Sacred
The sacred places of the Indian people and their protection have followed a winding course
in the federal courts over the last quarter century.513 A central pivot point was the Supreme Court’s
denial of First Amendment, free exercise protection in the Lyng514 case but, simultaneously, its
affirmance of a zone of possible religious accommodation presumably within the limits of the
establishment clause.515 The affirmative efforts of the federal land managers – at places like
Devil’s Tower516, Rainbow Bridge517, Cave Rock518 and the Bighorn Medicine Wheel519 – were,
unsuccessfully attacked by conservative litigators as transgressions of the First Amendment
Establishment Clause. The United States and the tribes were repeatedly able to show a secular

reconciled as brothers and sisters, and harmoniously steward and protect this land
together.’ Of course, the apology also makes it clear that it in no way admits
liability in any of the dozens of lawsuits still pending against the U.S. government
by Native Americans.”
Accessed at http://usgovinfo.about.com/b/2012/12/27/did-you-know-the-us-apologized-to-nativeamericans (4/17/2015)
513

See supra, notes 198-217
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See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assc. 485 U.S. 439, 448 (1988)
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Though the Court didn’t delve into the limits of the Establishment Clause, it did say, “Nothing
in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any
citizen The Governments’ right to the use of its own lands, for example, need not and should not
discourage it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian
respondents.” 485 U.S. at 453-454.
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Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association 2 F.Supp.2d 1948 (D.Wyo 1998).

517

Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston, 209 F.Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002).
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Access Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture, 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Wyoming Sawmills, incorporated v. United States Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D.
Wyo. 2001)
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purpose.520 There clearly is not a doctrinal purpose in sacred site cases as Indian religion is
essentially ceremonial and non-proselytizing.521 In addition, the United States, had in virtually all
cases its own compatible historic and recreational concerns.522

520

The most complete discussion – and dismissal – of the establishment clause
argument was rendered by the Wyoming District Court in the Devils tower case,
See Bear Lodge, supra note 516, at 2 F.Supp. 2d 1448, 1453-1458. The court said:
“The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . “ (U.S. const. amend, I) The
Courts of this country have long struggled with the type and extent of limitations
on government action which these ten words impose. At its most fundamental level
the United States Supreme Court has concluded that this provision prohibits laws
“which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711
(1947). Defining this prohibition on a case by case basis has proven a difficult
endeavor, but the Court has developed a number of useful frame words for
conducting the analysis. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29
L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the court established a three part test for delineating between
proper and improper government actions. According to this test a governmental
action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2)
does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Id, at 1453-1454.
521

See Ellen Sewell “The American Indian Religious Freedom Act” 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 430 (1983),
“The courts’ position that protection of Indian religion constitutes religious
establishment fails to take into account the peculiar character of Indian religion as
compare to religions of faith and doctrine. The government’s introduction to the
Task Force Report, in a position taken up by the Navajo Medicinemen’s
Association, has argued in effect that government aid for Indian religion poses no
establishment threat because of the unique character of Indian religion. The
argument is that because Indian religions are ceremonial, not doctrinal, they are not
proselytizing, making no claims to ultimate truths that believers are obligated to
spread. Therefore they have no impulse to impose the religion beyond the tribe,
and so pose no threat of establishment. By contrast, Christianity has been devoted
to conversion of the nonbeliever; the establishment clause was carved out of battles
for power among Christians who asserted exclusive claims to truth.”

Id at 462.
522

See eg, supra note 518, “the Establishment Clause does not bar the government from protecting
a historically and culturally important site simply because the site’s importance derives at least in
part from its sacredness to certrain groups. 499 F.3d 1036, at 1046.
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The defendants were also able to meet the demand of an absence of coercion
because, in most cases, the land management plans were voluntary523, and in other cases, closures
were temporary524, or non exclusive525 and not accompanied by controversial imagery.526 Finally,
the plans or laws operated prospectively and did not offend vested rights.527 Indeed, in some of the
cases, the plaintiffs were not even able to argue the establishment clause because they could not
show a constitutional basis for standing.528
The Supreme Court and Congress have recently rolled out the welcome mat of
protection and accommodation for Christian interest in a way that may make the Indian concerns
seem almost quaint. The Court was able to find that the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(RFRA)529 and standing were available to protect sensitive concerns of corporate employers who
feared that their Obamacare tax dollars would go towards forms of employee birth control that
operate post-conception and offend the owners religious convictions.530 This was rather confusing
to the Navajo and Hopi.
“The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which held
that the Affordable Care Act’s “contraceptive mandate” violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act when applied to certain closely-held corporations,
generated strong reactions from every corner of the political realm. The religious
right and anti-abortion camps claimed it as a definitive victory for religious freedom
and a blow to governmental interference with core religious beliefs. Advocates for
523

Bear Lodge, supra note 516 at 2 F.Supp.2d 1448, 1453-1455.
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Id at 1451.
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Access Fund, supra note 518, at 499 F.3d. 1036, 1045.
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Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 519 at 179 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1294.
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Wyoming Sawmills, 383 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Tenth cir. 2011).

528

Id, see also Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston, 98 Fed. Appx 711, 715 (10th Cir. Utah)
and Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 822 (10th Cir. 1999).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb (et. seq), see supra notes 207-213.
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See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. 134 S. Ct 2751, 2779 (2014), supra at notes 214-217.
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women’s rights and the ACA decried it as a blatant attack on women’s health and
family planning.

While the right cheered and the left wept, advocates for native religious
rights were left scratching their heads. After all, Indian tribes and their members
have attempted to use RFRA since it was enacted to protect sacred land from
desecration, maintain access to religious sites, and otherwise protect their religious
freedoms, only to be told over and over again that the challenged government
activity did not impose a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion.”531
The Supreme Court also found only accommodation and no establishment clause problems
with the use of federal personnel, land transfers and congressional funding decisions to protect the
continued display of a crucifix surrounded by federal land532; and the Court found no establishment
issues with Christian prayer preceding local legislative council meetings. 533 Congress joined the
parade with a recent law allowing the transfers of the Mount Soledad cross and its federal land to
private ownership, despite a Ninth Circuit ruling that the cross was an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion534.

531

Winter King “Could the Hobby Lobby ruling Have Saved the San Francisco Peaks?” Indian
Country Today, (7/15/14) accessed at http://indiancountrytoday medianetwork.com/
2014/07/15/could-hobby-lobby-ruling-have -saved (4/19/2015) It is note worthy, however, that
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Navajo Nation case, supra note 212, after the Ninth
Circuit failed to find a substantial burden. See Navajo Nation, et al v. United States Forest Service,
et al 129 S.Ct 2763 (2009).
532

Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715-722 (2010)
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Town of Greece N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824-1828 (2014).
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See Kristina Davis “Soledad Cross Land Transfer Approved”, (Dec. 12, 2014) accessed at
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/dec/12/soledad-cross-transfer-congress-land/all?p
(4/19/2015) The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the cross on federal land conveyed a
message of governmental endorsement of Christian religion that violated the Establishment
Clause. See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1117-1125 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth
Circuit will revisit the establishment clause soon in the case of Freedom From Religion foundation,
Inc. v. Weber 951 F.Supp.2d 1123 (D. Montana 2013) where the district court formed that the
statute of “Big Mountain Jesus”, located for almost 60 years on leased federal land, surrounded by
the Big Mountain Ski Area, had historical value and did not violate the establishment clause. 951
F. Supp.2d at 1134-1136.
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In sum, the federal government – Court and Congress – seem, perhaps, more inclined lately
to guard the spiritual essence of symbols and places – and this might include Indian sacred sites,
at least if there is no expansion of Indian sovereignty, and no interference with the gain seeking
that the United States might to make on “what is, after all its land.”535
In the end, Lyda Conley might be partially satisfied – pleased that the tiny cemetery and
its mystical aura has survived the full thrust and weight of urbanism. It exists, for the time being,
in a web of case law, statutes and history. But, she, and her resolute kinspeople patriots – such as
Jan English and Holly Zane – would be still wary that the pendulum of soulless, expedient
economic gain seeking might swing back toward the fragile miner’s canary536 in the central city.
She would hope, along with her modern relatives, that this sacred heart, still beating in the
desultory urban core, could support the Kansas Wyandots in their quest for recognition, and be an
alienable, invaluable part of enduring sovereign future.
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See Lyng, supra note 514, 485 U.S. at 453 . . . The proprietary tone of Lyng is, of course, less
applicable to situations such as Huron Cemetery, which are under treaty and, one might assume,
under the holdings that accord treaty rights the status of full beneficial ownership. See U.S. v.
Shoshone Tribe, supra note 346, 304 U.S. at 117. But, then, Senator Brownback’s Bill, which
preserved the sacredness of Huron Cemetery, also amounted to a Federal usurpation of the
Oklahoma Wyandotte’s vested economic rights.
536
Felix Cohen wrote:
[T]he Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played
in German. Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to
poison gas in our political atmosphere, and our treatment of Indians, even more
than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith.
Cohen, described as “The Blackstone of American Indian law was quoted by Steven McSloy
“The ‘Miner’s Canary’: A Bird’s Eye View of American Indian Law and Its Future”, 37 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 733 (2003); see also Rennard Strickland, “Indian Law and the miner’s
Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas” 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483 (1991)
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